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The world is currently experiencing what is termed "the information revolution". 
The ability to access, manipulate, and store information has grown tremendously due to 
computers and advanced telecommunications technology. Organizations, including the 
U.S. military, must adapt to the new technology available in order to effectively compete 
in the future world environment. In the case of the military, however, the task-based hier- 
archical structure and lack of an information technology infrastructure are preventing the 
efficient use of technology and information system integration. Barriers to integration, 
such as information hoarding, independent application development, lack of IT manage- 
ment, and external driver specialization, will continue to proliferate in task-task-based- 
based organizations. The military will be prevented from achieving success in information 
technology integration by the very structure it has created. Organizations must reengineer 
around the process rather than the task in order to achieve success in this area, and develop 
a sound information infrastructure to alleviate personnel from routine and repetitive work. 
This thesis provides a sample of how reengineering around the process and creating an 
information infrastructure can increase a naval aviation squadron's efficiency and make 
them more competitive in the future. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is about introducing revolutionary change within an organization 
whose structure and work philosophy have remained constant for decades. Recent envi- 
ronmental events have led to a sense of dissatisfaction with the way work is performed in 
a naval aviation squadron, and have led to a search for a better method of operations. So 
much time and effort is expended in performing work within a squadron that is not clear 
whether or not it is contributing to a desirable output or is merely a case of performing 
work for work's sake. With the changing environment comes the need to re-focus our 
effort in creating a more efficient, output oriented organization. 
The naval aviation squadron of today is expected to do more with less. In the cur- 
rent downsizing environment, the services are competing with each other for every scarce 
dollar available. It is apparent that in order for a squadron to survive in today's arena of 
environmental change, it must focus more on innovation, cost effectiveness, and customer 
satisfaction (Gore, 1993). Naval Aviation has to look inward at the way it does business; 
specifically at the way it is structured, how its basic processes are performed, and how 
they both allow for the implementation of new technology. 
The current naval squadron organizational structure is based on the premise that 
workers have a limited set of basic skills and work best when performing simple tasks. 
While this task-based structure provides an effective means of training and managing per- 
sonnel, it also requires a large amount of overhead and process complexity to make it 
work effectively. For lack of a better system, this structure has been tolerated for years, 
along with the inefficiencies and costs that are associated with it. Over time, layer upon 
layer of well intended instructions, directives, and procedures have been added to previous 
layers to form a hierarchy of bureaucratic red tape and complexity. This, coupled with the 
fact that no modern squadron information infrastructure has been developed, has resulted 
in an organization riddled with inefficiency, overwork, and inflexibility. 
The current state of information technology in the typical naval aviation squadron 
is rather primitive, and has been described by some as being in the "stone age". Other than 
a few of the training squadrons, which are just now beginning to develop an information 
infrastructure, there are no squadrons with inter-squadron local area networks. Systems 
like the Naval Aviation Logistics Command Information System (NALCOMIS) exist but 
serve the needs of only one functional area. A squadron will likely have a number of com- 
puters; however, they are isolated from one another and used for the most basic of tasks, 
such as word processing and limited database uses, or to run organically developed appli- 
cations. The technology exists that can solve the information infrastructure problems at a 
reasonable cost. To remain competitive, we must take advantage of this available technol- 
ogy and develop an effective organization capable of dealing with the uncertainty of the 
future. 
A. THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION 
Since at least the beginning of written history, environmental effects have forced 
fundamental change in man and his basic behavior. The invention of fire, the wheel, elec- 
tricity, and the cotton gin have all had a profound effect on the way man conducted him- 
self afterward. The relatively recent introduction of the computer is but another in the long 
line of revolutionary inventions to which society in general, and the military in particular, 
are still adapting. Just as it would be unfathomable to imagine life without electricity 
today, it will be unthinkable twenty years from now to live without computers. 
Within the span of a decade, the personal computer has risen from an expensive 
and obscure research tool to a relatively inexpensive and widely used platform. It is con- 
sidered the cornerstone of the information revolution and is transforming the way we do 
business, communicate and learn (Long & Long, 1993). Businesses and organizations 
which desire to remain on the cutting edge have adapted computers into their very way of 
conducting business with dramatic results. With each year that passes, computer technol- 
ogy innovations make the transition from the "old ways" easier and less expensive than 
ever. Indeed, according to the Commerce Department, business and consumer spending on 
high-tech equipment accounted for some 38% of economic growth since 1990 (Mandel, 
1994). Organizations that can't or won't make the leap to the computer world will quickly 
find themselves outdistanced by those with the foresight to do so. 
The use of information technology has evolved from the automation of structured 
processes to systems that are truly revolutionary in that they introduce change into funda- 
mental business procedures. It is believed that "more than being helped by computers, 
companies will live by them, shaping strategy and structure to fit new information technol- 
ogy" (Gurbaxani & Whang, 1991). Computerization is eliminating slack at every level of 
business, from the internal routines of single companies to the organization of industries 
and marketplaces. It's removing intermediaries, speeding transactions, rebalancing power 
relationships, and slashing costly fat - all of which is intensifying competition in the U.S. 
and around the world (Verity, 1994). 
B. THESIS JUSTIFICATION 
Through experience and interviews, several key problem areas have been identi- 
fied which exist in the naval aviation community. In order for naval air to remain a salient 
force in the nation's defense, these areas must be addressed and improved. The efficiency 
of the work performed must be increased, a competitive advantage maintained, and work 
focused toward desirable outputs. The community is currently failing short in these areas 
and must find a way to drastically improve in all of them. 
1. Efficiency 
Today's environment is forcing organizations to do more with less; less money, 
less people, and fewer assets. The years of abundant money in the Department of Defense 
are long gone, and naval aviation is feeling the pinch. The loss of the A-12 Avenger pro- 
gram, the retirement of the A-6 Intruder, and the reduction of F-14 squadrons are but a few 
of the examples of the cuts involved. Reductions in personnel and OPTAR are also having 
a negative effect on the training and readiness of squadrons. The fact is that the squadron 
of the future will have to work smarter than before to accomplish the same missions 
because the dollars just aren't there to support "old style" operations. 
One of the best methods to working smarter is to achieve a greater efficiency in the 
work that is performed. Fortunately for navy air, the current situation leaves a lot of room 
for improvement. The concept of efficiency, in general terms, deals with the ability to 
accomplish a job with the minimum amount of time and effort. In a more specific sense, 
efficiency in a squadron can be defined as the amount of time and effort put into a job 
divided by the amount of valued time and effort expended. Valued time and effort is the 
concept assigned to work that is specifically geared toward desired squadron outputs with- 
out being duplicated elsewhere in the organization. 
The distinction between time and effort and valued time and effort is important 
because the difference is actually wasted effort. When more than one person or department 
is performing the same job, the effort is duplicated and the time spent by one wasted. The 
classic example of this phenomenon is the recording of flight time statistics in a squadron. 
Both the Maintenance and the Operations Departments track and record flight time statis- 
tics. At the end of the month, the statistics must be reconciled between the two so that 
accurate reports can be prepared for distribution. This process consumes countless hours 
of administrative accounting for personnel in both departments, most of which is wasted 
effort. Efficiency in this area could be improved, for example, by providing a central data- 
base of flight statistics where they are entered once and everyone draws from the data. 
2. Competitive Analysis 
Interservice budgetary warfare is being conducted on a daily basis in Washington. 
A large portion of the debate revolves around the future of the aircraft carriers. The Air 
Force and Army are arguing that the carriers are too expensive a way to provide "forward 
presence" and that they do not contribute much to the outcome of the battle. They are 
pushing for large deck amphibious ships and Air Force squadrons to assume the role carri- 
ers now perform. They are asking for a three to four carrier reduction as well as a reduc- 
tion in F/A-18 E/F production. 
Missions once thought to be proprietary in nature are crossing the service lines in 
the name of jointness. EA-6B Prowler aircraft have assumed many of the electronic war- 
fare missions once owned by the Air Force EF-111 Wild Weasels. Air Force AWACS com- 
mand and control missions are being assumed by Navy E-2 aircraft in areas once 
considered sacred. Marine Corps F-18 squadrons are being deployed aboard carriers at a 
rate far exceeding those of the past. 
It is not just the competition among the services for scarce dollars that is the issue. 
Communities within naval aviation itself are also competing for missions in order to jus- 
tify their existence. Both the F-14 and F-18 communities are scrambling to fill the role 
soon to be relegated by the retiring A-6. ES-3's are now deploying with the carrier battle 
groups and are in direct competition with EP-3's for the electronic intelligence gathering 
role. 
With the shrinking defense budget comes the reality that unneeded service provid- 
ers will have to be cut. Those communities who can't provide the services required effi- 
ciently will likely fall to those who can. It is no longer a question of who can perform the 
mission, but one of who can perform the mission the best. 
3. Outcome-Based Processes 
The final area of concern involves focusing on work that produces outputs desir- 
able to the customers and stakeholders of squadron services. Work internal to the squadron 
which does not directly contribute to satisfying these people is, in essence, wasted work. 
The more wasted work and redundant tasks are performed, the less time and effort person- 
nel have to focus on jobs that are important, those which provide value toward the desired 
output goals. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is intended as a thought provoking piece and is largely the result of the 
dissatisfaction experienced with certain areas of squadron life. It is presented with a com- 
bined 17 years of naval aviation involvement, and the new perspective provided through 
the Information Technology Management curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
While the views are not grounded in scientific methodology, extensive research has been 
conducted into the areas of squadron processes and reengineering. 
What follows is a guided tour through the reengineering of a naval aviation squad- 
ron. Chapter II provides the background on reengineering necessary to understand our rea- 
soning and methodology for the project. Chapter III provides an analysis of a typical 
squadron and the problems associated with the current methods of operation. Chapter rv 
highlights a squadron which has been reengineered. Chapter V brings several important 
factors to light which are important in considering a reengineering effort. Finally, Chapter 
VI deals with the findings and recommendations for further research in the area. 
This introduction has provided insight into the climate in which organizations 
today, and more specifically naval aviation squadrons, must operate in. Several factors 
have been introduced which naval squadrons must focus on in order to survive in this cur- 
rent climate of changt and flexibility. A background on reengineering will now be pre- 
sented and is the basis on which this thesis is built. 

II.  REENGINEERING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The structure of most military organizations is based on Adam Smith's principle of 
"division of labor" where processes within the organization are divided into simplified, 
well defined tasks that people specialize in performing (Smith, 1776). In today's world, the 
processes necessary to piece these tasks back together have become so complicated that it 
is now ineffective to structure in this manner. This chapter focuses on a relatively new 
concept called "reengineering" which offers alternatives to the drawbacks commonly 
found in task-based organizations. 
The most basic explanation of reengineering is simply "starting over" (Hammer & 
Champy, 1993). This implies looking at the work required to create an organization's 
product or service and the processes required to deliver value to the customer. Three focal 
points exist that organizations must address in order to be successful in this arena; custom- 
ers, competition and change (Hammer & Champy, 1993). These focal points apply more 
and more to military organizations as well as to civilian business. Organizations within the 
military must focus on why they are in "business", and who they are in business to serve. 
The availability of information today has changed the concept of the customer 
from a dependent entity to a well-informed one. Customers now have more information 
available to them through television, computer, CD ROM, and other media sources than 
ever before. They are able to focus on quality, price, selection, and service and are no 
longer limited to one or two choices. Organizations, including military ones, that can't 
cater to customer satisfaction will be left for ones that can. A command must be able to 
impart its worth to its customers by providing its service in the most efficient and compe- 
tent manner possible, or the customer will find one that can. 
Another force acting upon military organizations is competition. The likelihood of 
contracting out the country's operational war-fighting and defense capability is far 
fetched, but competition does exist amongst the various service branches for missions and 
funding. In 1991, an internal propaganda war was being fought concurrently with Opera- 
tion Desert Storm. The various branches of the armed services were trying to prove, not 
only to senior members of the defense establishment, but also to the American people, that 
their particular branch of the service could perform their mission better than the others. In 
today's environment of limited funding, public scrutiny, and information availability, this 
type of competition will continue. If the Navy doesn't perform it's aviation mission up to 
the expectations of the customer, the Air Force will be available to step in and pick up the 
load. 
The third force an organization must deal effectively with is change and the 
change process itself. Organizations must look beyond quick fix repairs to existing pro- 
cesses and look at the process design itself. In most cases, fixing a piece of the system 
won't solve a problem. The "division of labor" around which squadrons are organized is 
no longer state of the art. The environment, people, culture, and technology in/with which 
the squadron operates has changed. Organizations designed to operate in one environment 
cannot be fixed to work well in another. 
B. REENGINEERING DEFINED 
Reengineering is a way to incorporate into a business the effects that customers, 
competition, and change have on an organization. Long-established procedures and para- 
digms are completely abandoned and processes, structures and organizations are designed 
or redesigned from the start. Trying to fine tune what already exists, or making incremen- 
tal changes that leave die basic structures intact isn't reengineering. What would the orga- 
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nization look like today if it were to be re-created, given the current state of technology, 
knowledge of organizational structure, customer needs, and organizational goals? 
Reengineering can be more formally defined as "The fundamental rethinking and 
radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical con- 
temporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service and speed". This formal 
definition contains four key words that are at the heart of reengineering, fundamental, rad- 
ical, dramatic and prccess (Hammer and Champy, 1993). 
In order for an organization to begin thinking about reengineering, it must ask the 
most basic of question about why they are in existence. The. fundamental aspect of reengi- 
neering forces organizations to look at the rules and assumptions about the way they do 
business (Hammer & Champy, 1993). To be able to reengineer, an organization must be 
able to forget the old rules and ways of conducting business, and focus on what the cus- 
tomer wants. The primary drive for new business processes then stems from the these 
focus areas. 
The word radical is included in the formal definition to force people to think "out 
of the box". The standard ways of doing business is simply not a good enough rational. A 
new way of accomplishing work must be formulated. Making superficial changes to exist- 
ing processes does not constitute reengineering (that is called business improvement). 
Reengineering involves reinventing the way businesses are run, and requires radical 
thought. 
Reengineering isn't about marginally improving a business, but dramatically 
improving the way a business operates and performs. An organization should never allow 
itself to become complacent or satisfied with its current state of performance. Only now is 
the military beginning to realize that business as usual cannot continue and that dramatic 
changes need to be made in order to satisfy the customer. It is the questioning of the way 
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things used to be don«, and redesigning new processes and structure that will eventually 
lead to dramatic impiovements in the service of military organizations. 
Arguably the most important of the four key words in the formal definition is the 
concept of the process. Processes encompass everything that is accomplished in an organi- 
zation, but are the most difficult to identify. Processes are a combination of people, tasks, 
structure and an organizations culture. The individual people and tasks are easily identi- 
fied but the manner in which they are all tied together is not. Hammer and Champy [1993] 
define a process as "a collection of activities that take one or more kinds of input and cre- 
ate an output that is of value to the customer." It is the process that delivers the product to 
the customer, not the individual tasks. 
Task-based thinking has influenced the organizational design of companies for the 
last two hundred years. However, organizations, in both the public and private sectors, are 
beginning to realize that they cannot continue business as usual if they are to survive. 
Reengineering then, is basically the search for new methods of organizing work, with a 
no-holds-barred attitude towards organizational structure, boundaries, tradition, conven- 
tional thinking, and paradigms. 
C. PROCESS REDESIGN 
The current military organizational model is based on the basic premise that work- 
ers have a limited set of basic skills, and they work best when performing simple tasks. 
However, these tasks require a large amount of overhead and complex processes to put 
them together once they are completed. For lack of a better system, this arrangement has 
been tolerated for years in the military, along with the inefficiencies and cost that are asso- 
ciated with a complex bureaucracy. A reengineered organization defies the division of 
labor theory and looks at processes as single entities. It is the process which must be kept 
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simple for it is the pu-oess which ultimately produce the end product or service for the 
customer. 
Process reengineering requires that several jobs be combined into a one. The once- 
simple tasks performed by specialists are combined in a natural order to form processes 
performed by generalists. When processes are large, the team concept can be used, with 
each member of the team performing/managing a particular piece of the process. The for- 
mation of task forces allow specialists to work together in teams to manage a process and 
ensure that it is properly designed and implemented (Drucker, 1988). 
The advantages of a single person, or team, handling an integrated process can be 
enormous. Workers can make decisions at the work level. The benefits include less delay 
time in completing processes, less managerial overhead, better customer response, and 
higher worker motivation (Hammer & Champy, 1993). Team members share the responsi- 
bility for the process as a whole (big picture) rather than just single tasks within it. With 
empowered workers or teams handling a process, managerial checks and controls can be 
significantly reduced. Controls serve to insure process compliance to standard operating 
procedures and dictated policy and are of no direct value to the process output. In a reengi- 
neered organization, non-value adding work is reduced or eliminated. 
Workers are not only trained in how to perform their work, but also educated in the 
entire process and ultimate goals of the organization. Most of the administrative work 
involved in compensating for the fragmentation of work, i.e. monitoring, tracking, recon- 
ciling, etc., is eliminated, and people spend more time performing real work that leads to 
accomplishing the organization's goals. Emphasis changes from training to education, to 
educate the workers why something is done as opposed to how a task is performed. 
The manager's role in a reengineered organization also changes, from a director to 
a coach. Managers become problem solvers and advice givers rather than supervisors 
(Hammer & Champy, 1993). The bureaucratic glue once required to paste all of the pro- 
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cesses together is dissolved and managers are allowed to assume an advisory role. Manag- 
ers in the reengineered organization must possess strong interpersonal skills and the 
ability to adapt to change. 
The role of company executives also changes in the organization; from score- 
keeper to leader (Hammer & Champy, 1993). The once vertical hierarchy is flattened and 
strategic managers are brought closer to the people who work in the organization. Com- 
munication is opened and ideas are shared freely. Executives can keep their fingers on the 
pulse of the company and lead by example rather than by decree. Perhaps most important, 
the executive is free from much of the process micromanagment necessary in task-based 
organizations, and free, to set strategic direction for the company. 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND REENGINEERING 
Information Technology plays a crucial role in business reengineering, but infor- 
mation technology itself can be easily misused. There is a huge difference between auto- 
mating a task and process redesign. Simply applying a technology to an already existing 
task is not reengineering, it is simply "paving a cow path." Applying automation to an 
existing task will likely improve the task but will do nothing for the process as a whole. 
The managerial glue still exists which holds all the automated processes together. Organi- 
zations that equate technology with automation can't reengineer (Hammer & Champy, 
1993). 
Technology should be used in conjunction with reengineering to better design a 
process and all it's associated work functions. In fact, technology can make reengineering 
possible because it allows people to do many more tasks than was once possible. Thus, 
information technology is an enabler that facilitates the reengineering process. 
In order to properly apply information technology in a reengineering sense, induc- 
tive reasoning needs to be used rather than deductive reasoning. Thinking inductively 
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requires that organization be innovative in their thinking of how to use the technology that 
is available (Hammer & Champy, 1993). For instance, the organization should be thinking 
"How can we use technology to allow us to do things that we are not already doing"? With 
deductive thinking, the organization might try and fit technology to existing tasks rather 
than redesigning the processes to fit the state of information technology that is available. 
Technology allows organizations to break old paradigms and create new ways of organiz- 
ing work. 
One of the major stumbling blocks to the effective implementation of IT is a lack 
of knowledge of what is available. Some of the current trends are: 
• Shared databases which allow the sharing of the same information concurrently 
throughout an organization. These systems increase efficiency and reduce over- 
head time by eliminating multiple data repositories, decreasing data entry time, 
increasing data accuracy, and allowing the data to be accessed by all who need it. 
• Expert systems which allow generalists the ability to perform the work of 
experts. These systems capture the knowledge of subject matter experts and 
present it to less knowledgeable workers in a usable format. 
• Decision support systems which allow decisions to be made at the worker level 
that used to have to travel up the chain of command for approval. These systems 
make the worker feel empowered and allow for faster and more effective deci- 
sion making, eventually leading to greater customer satisfaction. 
• Telecommunications networks which will allow companies to structure their 
organization the way that best suits them. Organizations will no longer be forced 
to a centralize in order to facilitate control and communication. Local area net- 
works (LAN's), wireless data communication networks, and cellular communi- 
cations will allow organizations to best structure itself to meet customer needs. 
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• Compact Disk (CD) technology which will allow once cumbersome publication 
management, to be virtually eliminated and allow instant access to any publica- 
tion or instruction from any remote location equipped to communicate. 
As more organizations reorganize business processes around information technol- 
ogy, it will be increasingly important for other organizations to keep up or become incom- 
patible and obsolete. It's hard to imagine a business today of significant size able to 
adequately compete while using a manual entry accounting system. Equally unfavorable 
will be future businesses unable to communicate effectively and quickly through the use 
of LAN's, electronic mail, and remote access to information. 
E. FOCUS ON OUTPUTS 
Reengineering is a valuable tool for integrating organizations into the future com- 
petitive marketplace. Unfortunately, it focuses only on the rethinking of processes neces- 
sary to provide the customer with the best product. A company may have reengineered to 
focus on certain measurable outputs that completely miss the mark on customer satisfac- 
tion. It also fails to address the importance of a quantifiable method of measuring outputs. 
In order for an organization to be completely successful in the future, reengineer- 
ing is not enough. The outputs of the organization must be identified and reengineered 
processes focused toward them. Many organizations (including the military) have fallen 
victim to funding inputs rather than outputs. Dollars are appropriated or apportioned to 
organizations who decide what they can and can't do with the level of funding they have 
received. This method results in ambiguous outputs and unmanageable processes. 
Organizations must focus on result oriented processes in their reengineering 
efforts. The desired end product is the most important goal and focus must be placed on 
achieving it efficiently and competently. This is how the customer eventually receives the 
most bang for the buck. 
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F. REENGINEERING IN THE MILITARY 
Most of the concepts brought to light in this chapter involve generic ideas applied 
to the current business environment. The obvious question then becomes "can reengineer- 
ing principles be applied successfully to the military command and control structure?". 
Many viewpoints undoubtedly exist which hold a pessimistic answer to the question. 
Arguments against reengineering in the military include: 
• The military is too large an organization to successfully complete such a grand 
undertaking. 
• The mission of the military is far too important to tinker with the traditional com- 
mand and cuntrol structure. The risk is too great. 
• Because senior military personnel are products of their "upbringing" through the 
ranks, it will be impossible to get the senior level support required to effect the 
change. 
• The pressures of combat demand a rigid structure with centralized decision mak- 
ing capability. No room exists for questioning or debating orders. 
• The way the military is currently structured is the way it's always been done and 
it has been successful. 
It is the central premise of this thesis that the very arguments against reengineering 
support, rather than undermine, the need for undertaking the effort. We present our case in 
the following chapters using a naval aviation squadron and its processes and structure to 
lay the groundwork for getting the point across. 
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HI.  CURRENT SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
This chapter outlines the organizational structure, task requirements, and state of 
information technology typical of those found in today's naval aviation squadrons. We 
present an analysis of squadron processes based on two IDEF-0 models - one which we 
created and one created by the Naval Aviation Maintenance Office (NAMO) in Patuxet 
River, Maryland. Problems with the current squadron design are then presented as an 
argument for reengineering squadron processes. 
A. SQUADRON STRUCTURE AND ANALYSIS 
1. The Strategic Apex 
The naval aviation squadron, like most military organizations, is based on a rigid 
vertical command-and-control hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is the Commanding 
Officer (CO) who is responsible for the squadron and its happenings. As with most mili- 
tary organizations, the CO is given absolute responsibility for the command and the 
authority to back it up. In the case of an operational squadron, the CO reports to the Air 
Wing Commander (CAG) as well as to the Type Commander at the unit's home station. 
Directly under the CO in the pecking order is the Executive Officer (XO). The XO 
is a screened Commander who will fleet up to take command of the squadron when the 
present CO's tour is complete. The XO is considered to be the administrative head of the 
squadron, with all paperwork and information flowing through his/her office. The XO 
heads most squadron boards and committees and is the President of the officers coffee 
mess. His responsibilities free up the CO to lead the squadron without allowing him/her to 
get buried in minutia. 
The third member of the "strategic apex" is the Command Master Chief (CMC). 
The CMC is generally the senior enlisted member in the squadron and is responsible to the 
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CO for the morale and discipline of the enlisted personnel assigned. The CMC is generally 
a counselor and a wealth of knowledge on naval customs and traditions. 
The strategic apex of a squadron controls the strategic planning and goal setting of 
the organization. Policy and tasking are directed downward, with the understanding that 
the status of assigned tasks be reported back up the chain. This level represents the highest 
overall decision making authority in the squadron, both administratively and operation- 
ally. 
2. Departments 
Under the strategic apex, a squadron is divided into functional units called depart- 
ments. A department is directly responsible to the strategic apex for achieving certain 
functional duties within the squadron. The departments operate autonomously, each with 
differing and sometimes conflicting agendas. Each department is headed by a 0-4 (LCDR) 
who reports directly to the strategic apex and has the responsibility for the operation of 
their department. The four departments common to every naval aviation squadron are 
Maintenance, Operations, Administration, and Safety. Although squadrons exist with 
additional departments, these four are the core departments and will be the only ones 
addressed in this thesis. 
a. Maintenance 
Maintenance is the largest department in the squadron and is tasked with 
the physical maintenance and support of the aircraft assigned to the squadron. It is unique 
among departments in that it is assigned the majority of the squadron's enlisted personnel. 
It is also the only department with two chains of command - operational and administra- 
tive. 
The Maintenance department has its own strategic apex in the form of the 
Maintenance Officer (MO), the Assistant Maintenance Officer (AMO), and the Mainte- 
nance Master Chief. They have a support staff of chiefs and Aviation Maintenance Admin- 
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istration Specialists (AZ's) who all operate out of Maintenance Control. Maintenance 
Control coordinates the maintenance effort on all the aircraft and serves as the operational 
point of command for the individual work centers in the department. The workcenters liai- 
son directly with Maintenance Control for all maintenance related activities and aircraft 
problems. Maintenance Control also serves as the duty officer's link with the Maintenance 
department in the execution of the daily flight schedule. Figure 1 represents the opera- 
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Figure 1. Maintenance Department Operational Chain of Command. 
Because of its size and many specialization ratings, the department is fur- 
ther sub-divided into divisions, branches, and workcenters, each with an officer or a senior 
chief responsible for its management. These divisions and branches represent the adminis- 
trative chain of command within the department and exist to divide the department into 
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Figure 2. Maintenance Department Administrative Chain of Command. 
It is important that the difference between the operational and administra- 
tive chains of command be understood. Operationally, a Shop Supervisor reports directly 
to Maintenance Control on any matter dealing directly with the maintenance effort and 
his/her shop's responsibility. If it has anything to do with the maintenance of aircraft, the 
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operational chain is used. If the same Shop Supervisor wants to take leave, needs an eval- 
uation, or gets into legal trouble, it is handled through the administrative chain. The Divi- 
sion and Branch Officers are responsible for the tasks necessary to keep the personnel in 
their respective divisions/branches happy and able to work. Generally, if a matter doesn't 
deal directly with maintaining aircraft, it belongs to the administrative chain. 
b. Operations 
The Operations department is responsible for the planning and execution of 
the squadron's activities. These include but are not limited to: 
• Creating and publishing the daily flight schedule. 
• Tactical academic training of all squadron aircrew. 
• Coordinating the operational aspects of all squadron movements arid deploy- 
ments. 
• Monitoring the progress of all airborne aircrew training. 
• Maintaining and updating the aircrew's NATOPS flight qualification jackets and 
flight log books. 
• Providing intelligence assistance for squadron/airwing strike planning. 
The department is headed by the Operations Officer and is assigned a small 
cadre of officers under him/her. Typical jobs in the department include Assistant Opera- 
tions Officer, Schedules Officer, Training Officer, Operations Admin Officer, Tactics 
Officer, and one-two Intelligence Officers. A small number of enlisted personnel are usu- 
ally assigned to handle administrative and intelligence duties. The Operations Yeoman 
types the flight schedule and performs any administrative tasks required by the operations 
staff. Intelligence Specialists work closely with the Intelligence Officers to provide strike 
planning support to the squadron aircrew. A Graphic representation of the typical Opera- 






















Figure 3. Operations Department Organizational Structure. 
c. Administration 
The Administration department supports the squadron's personnel and han- 
dles the paperwork burden for the strategic apex. Their areas of responsibility include, but 
are not limited to: 
• Maintaining the pay and service records of all personnel assigned to the squad- 
ron. 
• Performing any word processing required for squadron personnel such as evalua- 
tions, awards, promotions, and articles. 
• Maintaining the instruction library for the squadron. 
• Promoting the squadron in a positive light (public affairs). 
• Performing legal services for the CO/XO. 
• Maintaining the cleanliness of squadron spaces (janitorial). 
• Updating and maintaining message traffic, both in and out of the squadron. 
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• Coordinatins and tracking advancement requirements for enlisted personnel. 
The department is run by the Administrative Officer (AO) and is divided 
into separate halves under him/her. The Personnel division, is headed by the Personnel 
Officer and is tasked with supporting the squadron's enlisted members. All service record 
business, promotion proceedings, and discharges are performed by the Personnel office. 
The office is also responsible for tracking squadron manning. 
The Admin division is headed by the Assistant Administrative Officer and 
handles all departmental matters not directly involved with enlisted personnel support. 
The Admin division also liaisons closely with the strategic apex for direct tasking. Typical 
jobs in the department include Personnel Supervisor, Personnel Staff, Legal Officer, Pub- 
he Affairs Officer, Educational Services Officer, First Lieutenant, Admin Supervisor, and 
Admin staff. The Administrative department structure is illustrated in Figure 4. 
d. Safety 
The Safety department is the smallest department in the squadron and is 
charged by the CO to uphold and promote his/her safety policy. The department head is 
the Safety Officer, usually a graduate of the safety school in Monterey, CA. In addition to 
running the department, the safety officer is trained to act as Command coordinator if a 
mishap occurs in the squadron. Other departmental responsibilities include: 
• Maintaining the squadrons NATOPS records and publications library. 
• Conducting safety/NATOPS training for aircrew and shop personnel. 
• Conducting NATOPS check rides for aircrew. 
• Conducting periodic safety meetings with designated command representatives. 
The department is generally assigned only three to four officers and one 
senior enlisted person. The typical jobs include NATOPS Officer, Ground Safety Officer, 
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Figure 4. Administrative Department Structure. 
3. Structural Analysis 
The structure of a naval aviation squadron can be described as a classic divisional- 
ized form, as explained by Henry Mintzberg, with each division operating as a separate 
machine bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1981). Mintzberg describes this type of an organization 
as one where the bulk of the work is done in quasi-autonomous units called divisions. The 
divisions serve specific market areas and house their own functional units. The divisions 
are given a certain amount of autonomy but are responsible to the strategic apex for 
achieving certain measurable results (Bolman & Deal, 1991). Figure 6 diagrams a squad- 
ron in divisionalized form using Mintzberg representation. 
Mintzberg divides an organization structurally into five sectors; the operating core, 
middle line, strategic apex, technostructure, and support staff (Mintzberg, 1981). 
At the base of the image is the operating core, which performs the basic work of 
the organization (Bolman & Deal, 1991). In the case of a naval squadron, this sector is 
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organized by departments, each structured as its own machine bureaucracy. The depart- 
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Figure 5. Safety Department Structure. 
Directly above the operating core is the middle line which is composed of those 
managers who supervise, control, and provide resources for the operating core (Bolman & 
Deal, 1991). In the squadron model, these are the department heads. They are empowered 
by the strategic apex (CO, XO, CMC) to operate autonomously yet are held accountable 
for specific results. 
The technostructure of an organization consists mainly of analysts whose role it is 
to standardize the work of others by inspecting outputs and processes. In the case of the 
squadron, this function is performed either by groups outside the organization, or it is 
pushed down to the department level. At the squadron level, this sector is non-existent. 
The support staff "performs tasks that indirectly facilitate the work of the operating 
core (Bolman & Deal, 1991). In the squadron model, the support staff is represented by 
the Administrative department because many of the tasks they perform fit the definition 
given. In reality, Admin can fit into both the support staff and the operating core sectors, 
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Figure 6. Mintzberg Representation of Squadron Structure. 
The fifth sector, the strategic apex, consists of the top-level managers who relate 
primarily to the organization's external environment. They create the organization's goals 
and provide strategic direction. In the squadron, these individuals are the CO, XO, and 
CMC. 
As mentioned earlier, the departments in a squadron can be described as machine 
bureaucracies. In a machine bureaucracy, the most important decisions are made at the 
strategic apex, with the day-to-day operations controlled by managers and standardized 
procedures. Many layers commonly exist between the apex and the operating layers and 
the structure has large support staffs and technostructures (Bolman & Deal, 1991). 
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Because the Maintenance department is the largest and most complex in the squad- 
ron, it will be used as the example. Figure7 illustrates how the department fits the machine 
bureaucracy description. 



















Figure 7. The Maintenance Department as a Machine Bureaucracy. 
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4. Specialization of Tasks 
The task structure of today's naval squadrons can be traced to Adam Smith's princi- 
ple of "Division of Labor" (Smith, 1776). Smith formulated that complex tasks are broken 
down into increasingly simpler ones until it becomes easy to train and manage the person 
performing the task. The result of this "assembly line process" is a large fragmentation of 
work and job specialization. Middle-level managers and workers have very limited discre- 
tion about how to do their jobs and follow a strict set of work guidelines established at the 
apex. 
The structure of the naval aviation squadron is perfectly adapted to take advantage 
of the division of labor. The jobs performed in the offices and shops are strictly controlled 
and highly standardized. Squadron personnel are trained in only one area of expertise (rat- 
ings) and will remain in that area until senior enough to manage. Several managerial lay- 
ers exist to help deal with the complex problems generated by the task-based design. 
This organizational structure is ideally suited for the planning and control of orga- 
nizational goals. The idea is that since work is broken down into manageable pieces, it is 
easily supervised for quality and consistency. One function of a Division Officer (mid- 
level manager) is to manage the work of the various workcenters under his span of con- 
trol, and to orchestrate the piecing of it back together again. In this structure, each level in 
the hierarchy is responsible for cementing all the tasks results together in some usable 
form. The simpler the tasks become, the more difficult the processes must be surrounding 
them. 
5. Problems with Task-Based Structure 
Obvious trade-offs exist in a task-based structure such as ours. Along with the 
advantages of better organizational control, standardization, and task simplicity, we inherit 
problems of complexity, inefficiency, redundancy, inflexibility, and lack of innovation. In 
a organization that is focused on a standardized output in a stable environment, Smith's 
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principles still have applications. In a fluid environment with ever changing outputs, the 
division of labor is inefficient and outdated. Some of the problems with the naval aviation 
squadron's structure v/ill now be discussed. 
a. Complexity 
The processes that occur in a squadron are nothing if they are not complex. 
Any output from a squadron demands that several tasks be performed, often across depart- 
mental borders, for the output to be realized. The individual tasks may be simple and 
involve little complexity, but the process of achieving the output (combining the individ- 
ual tasks) will be ver complex. Let's consider an example. 
Every unit in the United States Navy is responsible for submitting perfor- 
mance evaluations on their enlisted members on a periodic basis. The process is usually 
initiated by the Personnel Officer for topside evaluations and the Assistant Maintenance 
Officer for Maintenance evaluations. Admin division Yeoman and Maintenance division 
Yeoman dig through service records (called screening) to find all the personnel who 
require an evaluation. Once the list of required evaluations is compiled, a enlisted evalua- 
tion "brag" sheet is distributed to all eligible personnel via their branch officers, work cen- 
ter supervisors, and direct supervisors. It is the responsibility of the individual to insure 
these forms are filled out and returned by the due date; however, it usually the workcenter 
supervisor that catches heat from above if the task is not accomplished. 
When the brag sheets have been returned to either the AMO's or the Per- 
sonnel office, they are transformed into rough evaluation forms and distributed to the 
responsible officers for their comments. In the maintenance department, the evaluation 
roughs go to the appropriate division officer. For topside personnel, the roughs go to the 
officer designated by the department head as the division officer for the department. The 
responsible officers send the evaluations down to the respective branch officers, who send 
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the evaluations back to the workcenter supervisors where the forms are checked for accu- 
racy and comments written in the "comments" section. 
The rough forms come back up the chain they just went down where each 
person takes a "cut" at the evaluation and checks the data for completeness and accuracy. 
Errors are found at each level and comments are changed to reflect standardization across 
the level of the particular officer. A division officer may receive 10 evaluations from each 
of his three Branch Officers. Each branch Officer has ranked the 10 people in his/her 
branch and likely have differing writing styles. The division officer is required to take the 
three separate inputs and combine them into one standardized ranking and writing style. 
The evaluations are then passed to the AMO or personnel officer for the same process. In 
the case of the AMO, he/she receives input from five division officers and must perform 
the same process on them that the division officers performed when getting the evalua- 
tions from the branch officers. 
Once this process has run its cycle, the rough evaluations are re-typed into 
smooth evaluations, redistributed back down the chain (usually only to the division officer 
level), and checked once again for accuracy and content. Corrections are made and the 
final evaluations are distributed back to the division officers for debrief and signature. 
This process is run at separate times of the year for each enlisted rank and 
is very similar for officers. The process is usually initiated two months prior to the due 
date for the evaluations because of the time and coordination required at all levels. The 
individual tasks required at any particular time any one level are not difficult or particu- 
larly time consuming. The entire process of getting an evaluation out the door; though, can 
be extremely complicated and time consuming. 
b. Inefficiency 
The inefficiency of task-based work processes is evident from the example 
shown above. The amount of process "glue" that must be applied to cement the tasks 
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together is extraordinary. A division officer in the above example may handle a single 
evaluation six to eight times before it out of the division for good. Evaluations are typed 
and re-typed numerous times. The data required for the evaluation may be physically 
located in several different areas and is generally looked up and checked manually at each 
step. Reams of paper, countless man hours, and piles of instructions are involved in each 
round of evaluations generated. 
c. Redundancy 
In many cases, redundancy is a desireable attribute for business methods. 
Computer data back-ups, for example, are protective measures to prevent the loss of 
important data. Redu idancy can, however, contribute negatively to an organization as 
well. Identical tasks performed in numerous locations throughout an organization lead to 
problems with standardization, data accuracy, and coordination. In addition, time is 
wasted by personnel in duplicating the effort of others that could be used more effectively 
by producing valued work. 
Revisiting the evaluation example, the task of checking a members vital 
data (name, social security number, date of birth, etc.) at each step of the evaluation pro- 
cess is redundant. It occurs because errors are still generated and found at each step. The 
Yeoman who types the smooth evaluation may hit the wrong key in transferring the mem- 
bers ssn, causing an error late in the process. This example of redundancy causes non- 
value added work to bog down the entire process. If a method could be created to let the 
computer generate the forms from a central database, the redundancy in the current pro- 
cess could be eliminated completely. 
d. Inflexibility 
Because task-based jobs are designed to be simple, the processes required 
to unite them and produce outputs are very complex.. Since managers in task-based orga- 
nizations are responsible for the orchestration of tasks to produce a result, they are likely 
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to demand rigidity in as much of the process as they can control. The more flexibility they 
allow in the process, the more complicated their already complex jobs become. As a result, 
processes with task-based structure tend to have reams of instructions associated with 
them. In naval aviation, it is very common to have a set of instructions governing a pro- 
cess generated at each level in the chain of command. These instructions tend to be more 
specific with each level travelled down the chain. 
Because external controls encourage bureaucratization and centralization, 
the machine bureaucracy is often assumed by organizations that are tightly controlled 
from the outside. Thai is why government agencies, which are subject to many such con- 
trols, tend to be driven toward this structure regardless of their other conditions. (Mintz- 
berg, 1981) 
In the case of evaluations, instructions for their completion are generated 
from the bureau of Naval Personnel in Washinton, D.C. As they trravel down the chain of 
command, each level adds more specifics on how evaluations should be completed. At the 
command level, the CO will generate evaluation guidelines to be used as standardization 
for the entire squadron while the Administrative Officer and Assistannt Maintenance 
Officer publish even more specific guidelines in order to control their domains. Under the 
current system, this specificity is required because, without it, the evaluations generated 
would be completely non-standardized. 
e. Lack of Innovation 
An organization is a system, with a logic of its own, and all the weight of 
tradition and inertia. The deck is stacked in favor of the tried and proven way of doing 
things and against the taking of risks and striking out in new directions (Rockefeller, 
1973). 
Task-based organizations are well suited to achieving one specific purpose, 
not adapting to new ones. Workers in such organizations may see the need for changing 
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the way their job is performed and may even pass the idea up, but in most cases that is the 
last they will hear of it. Managers in these situations may see the lofty vertical hierarchy 
and give up, or consider themselves too busy with their current workload to futily attempt 
to change a task or process. Be it a worker or a manager, task-based organizations tend to 
promote the building of ruts. The structure of the system wasn't designed to support inno- 
vation and change. When change is attempted, the resistance encountered can be similar to 
driving into a brick wall. 
This point can be illustrated using a reletively minor change instituted by 
the CO of a Fleet Replacement Squadron in 1993. The CO directed the Phaseheads of the 
Visual Weapons (Visweps) training phase to construct a new flight syllabus for the stage to 
take advantage of the improved computer generated attack capabilities of the aircraft. The 
directed changes consisted of eliminating several student manual bombing flights (no 
computer aided releases) and replacing them with system bombing hops (computer aided 
releases). The CO felt that the increased emphasis on system deliveries was in keeping 
with the fleet requirements. 
With the backing of the CO, the phaseheads were in charge of designing 
and implimenting the new syllabus. Because of "normal" workload at the time, the phase- 
heads had to design the new syllabus during "off' time. It took over a month to complete 
the details and sell the program to the CO. Among the changes was a redesignation of the 
Phase from Visweps to Weapons/Tactics. The new syllabus was christened on the next 
detachment and was received with an extraordinary amount of resistance from the instruc- 
tors. The resulting friction resulted in bickering among the staff and poor performance 
among the students. The aircraft were not maintained in a state necessary to support the 
system deliveries and resultant incomplete flights further complicated the situation. 
The bottom line is that in 1995, problems still exist in the same areas as 
were initially discovered and people still call the phase "Visweps". Even though the 
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change was directed and supported from above and, in the author's view, was a sound 
idea, little has changed from prior to the change. Progress is being made but at a snails 
pace. Lastly, the phaseheads responsible for instituting the change underwent an 
extremely stressful month and their primary job performance suffered due to the added 
workload. 
6. Squadron Personnel 
The nature of the work force has changed significantly since the inception of the 
squadron organization. Workers (sailors) today are better educated, more highly skilled, 
and better motivated than in the past. No longer do all of the decisions have to be made at 
the top of the hierarchy. Decision making can be pushed down the chain to better 
informed, more capable managers and technicians. Today's sailors expect, and even 
demand, to make more of a contribution to the ultimate performance of the squadron. 
In the past, the focus on personnel has been to train them, rather than to educate 
them about the processes that they are working in. Training has always been the number 
one issue in personnel management, and has historically been the number one indicator of 
a squadrons ability to perform. Training is a very important aspect in ones' ability to per- 
form his/her job, and cannot be overlooked. A jet engine mechanic has to know how to 
repair an engine if he/she is to perform his/her job, however, educating him/her in the 
overall repair process, and how their job fits into the grand scheme is becoming increas- 
ingly important. With the knowledge of the overall process, the sailor will be better able to 
contribute to the improvement of the entire repair process, which can in turn lead to better 
squadron performance, not to mention a satisfied sailor. 
With today's better educated sailors, educating and coaching them is taking on 
more significance. Managers, i.e. division officers and division chief petty officers, will 
have more of a responsibility to educate and coach, along with the more traditional task of 
providing specialty training. 
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7. Squadron Culture 
The vertical structures in the divisionalized hierarchy of the squadrons are built on 
very narrow pieces of a process, with each department performing many of the same 
pieces of the same process. The people actually performing the task are looking inward to 
their department to complete the task, ignorant to what the rest of the organization is doing 
regarding the same task. Each division officer and department head is also looking inward 
to his/her division or department to complete the task, in order to pass it on to the next 
level in the chain of command. No one is in charge of the process, but everyone is working 
on pieces of it. What ■esults are the consequences of the division of labor and the fragmen- 
tation of processes; inaccurate, error prone reports, redundancy of data, and products of 
low quality. 
The divisionalized structure of a squadron promotes many cultural norms. The 
department heads are very parochial and are often unconcerned of how their actions/sug- 
gestions effect the other departments. This attitude permeates the ranks and often results in 
inter-departmental disputes. The classic departmental head-butting example is between 
maintenance and operations. A naturally dipolar relationship exists between these two 
departments. Maintenance's job is to supply the aircraft for the flight schedule generated 
by operations, and operations must insure that it plans for a realistic schedule. If mainte- 
nance has a hard day and can't fill the flight schedule, it makes operations look bad. If 
operations writes a overly ambitious flight schedule, it makes maintenance look bad. This 
adversarial relationship between departments is common and solidly ingrained in naval 
aviation squadrons. 
Information is a valuable quantity in a squadron because it is held closely to the 
chest. Department head meetings are held behind closed doors and the information is dis- 
seminated as if it were money. The "I've got a secret game" is played often and well. Very 
often, important information is withheld or given late to those who require it. With the fast 
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paced and stressful operational tempo, often people just forget to pass information. In a 
squadron, information is power and those who posses it are unwilling to part with it unec- 
essarily. 
Another common adversarial relationship that exists is between the junior officers 
(JO's) and the department heads. JO's commonly refer to the department heads as "hinge- 
heads" or "lick-doctors" because of the perception that they are yes men for the CO and 
XO. It is widely thought by many JO's that the department heads are doing anything that 
is required to receive a good fitness report, regardless of the consequences to those below. 
Overzealous commitments and impossible deadlines are made resulting in unecessarily 
overworking the troo; • > - sometimes on weekends. This adversarial relationship also exists 
between the workcen'er supervisors and their workers. 
Another cultural issue worth mentioning is the stigma associated with squadron 
effectiveness. Squadrons are judged and compared with other squadrons three ways; two 
official and one unofficial. The two official methods (short of war) are through competi- 
tions and inspections. Competitions allow the squadron the opportunity to show case it's 
ability. The competitions allow the aircrew to simulate various missions that would be 
employed during an actual war time scenario. The entire squadron takes great pride in 
being able to make sure that all of the squadrons resources are available for the competi- 
tion, as they would be during a war, and performance is a total team effort. The competi- 
tions are a time for the entire squadron to demonstrate what it has accomplished during it's 
training. 
The inspection process, though somewhat less glamorous, is as important to a 
squadron as the competitions that it participates in. The inspection process is one of the 
major ways that a squadron can demonstrate that it is working towards and obtaining it's 
goals. Inspections can be performed in-house, for instance, by the maintenance depart- 
ments QA division, or by a command outside the squadron. Either way, the inspections are 
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scheduled, and what is to be inspected is known well in advance. The inspectors will use a 
checklist to rate every aspect of a squadrons function; for example, is the proper training 
being held at the required time, or are all of the work center personnels' training jackets 
up-to-date? The task-based work structure lends itself perfectly to this type of evaluation 
system since the people performing the inspections can easily review the well defined 
tasks and the documentation pertaining to them. The results of an inspection are then used 
to rate how well a squadron is performing. Unfortunately, a lot of gamesmanship is used in 
preparing for inspections which leads to an artificial picture of reality. 
Preparing for these inspections, whether it be an inspection on a particular work 
center, or a command wide inspection, is a large management function. Management con- 
centrates on making sure that their little pieces of the process are performed in order to 
meet the inspection requirements, rather than to ensure that the entire process is completed 
properly. Preparing for the next inspection is as important, if not more so, than making 
sure that what is completed should even be done at all, let alone whether or not it will help 
the squadron attain it's goals. In the absence of a better method, squadrons are evaluated 
on how well they perform on inspections rather than on how well they are completing 
their missions and goals, and satisfying the customer. 
The third, and very unofficial method of squadron evaluation is informal attitudes 
and gossip about how squadrons are performing. Because of the close proximity and simi- 
lar missions of the squadrons, the communities are very tight. It seems like everyone 
knows what the other squadrons are up to and everyone is quick to criticize or praise them. 
It would be similar to locating IBM, Apple, and Sun on the same block. Although no for- 
mal means of evaluation is presented in this situation, the grapevine has a definite effect 
on how squadrons are perceived on the base and within the community. 
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8. Level of 1 information Technology 
The current state of information technology in the typical naval aviation squadron 
is primitive, and has been described by some as being in the "stone age". Other than a few 
of the training squadrons, which are just now beginning to develop an information infra- 
structure, there are no squadrons connected to an integrated local area network, either 
inside or outside of the squadron. A squadron will have a number of computers, however, 
they are isolated from one another and used for the most basic of tasks, such as word pro- 
cessing and limited database uses, or to run organically developed applications. 
Several specialized information systems are currently making their way into avia- 
tion commands. One such system used exclusively by the squadron maintenance depart- 
ment is the Naval Aviation Logistic Command Information System (NALCOMIS), which 
used to track the status of requisitioned items, by squadron, from the supply system. It also 
provides the squadron maintenance departments with statistics concerning various mainte- 
nance actions, aircraft and component maintenance history, and aircraft flight summary 
information. This system has been in the developmental stage since the early 1980's and is 
scheduled to be used well into the next century. 
This system, however, is not for general use. The information contained in the 
database that may be of importance to the operations or safety departments is not easily 
accessible to the people who need it. For example, the flight summary information has to 
be entered into two different information systems, NALCOMIS and the one in operations. 
This situation illustrates the problem of duplication of effort. The pilot has to enter the 
same flight summary information into two separate information systems. This raises prob- 
lems of duplication of effort and inconsistency of data/multiple storage locations. These 
problems will be discussed below. 
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a. Information Hoarding 
Information is a very important commodity within the squadron and with- 
out the ability to share the information, the squadron would not be able to complete it's 
mission. But rather than having a local area network to connect the various departments 
within a squadron, there exists an archaic method of using status boards, phone calls, 
memos, and paper driven requests. Information that could be used by all departments, may 
reside with only one >f the departments, with very limited access to it. This phenomenon 
results from the parochial machine bureaucracy nature of the departmental structure. 
Countless hours of wisted time is spent tracking down information in other departments 
that has the ability to be shared conveniently. Information within a squadron, or any orga- 
nization, should be captured once at its source and shared (Sprague & McNurlin, 1993). 
b. Independent Application Development 
Since the information technology infrastructure is not available/nonexist- 
ent in the squadron, computer literate members take it upon themselves to develop appli- 
cations to automate their tasks. This type of haphazard software development is an 
immediate solution to the problem at hand, but can lead to a number of problems unfore- 
seen by the developer. The biggest problem is the testing and validation of the program's 
output (or lack of). Without proper testing and validation of the developed application, the 
information produced will always be suspect as to accuracy and validity. Another major 
concern is the maintenance and documentation of the application once the original pro- 
grammer has left the squadron. Many times when the original user leaves, the program is 
never used again. Finally, none of the software developed in-house is likely to be compat- 
ible with any other software that was developed in-house. Chances are there will be 
numerous programs that can share the same data, but will never be able to do so because 
the software is incompatible. 
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c. La k of Information Technology Management and Training 
The squadrons lack any kind of information technology plan. The comput- 
ers are provided by people outside of the squadron, but no plan exists to train the users or 
provide any guidance on how to use the equipment effectively. The absence of informa- 
tion technology specialists leaves the squadrons up to their own devices on how to best 
use the computing resources that they have. This generally falls on the shoulders of the 
individual who makes it known (through words and action) that he/she is an expert. 
The computers that the squadrons possess are isolated units used to per- 
form departmental specific tasks. Users have very little opportunity to receive formal 
training on the software that is installed. In many instances, the software being used is 
brought in by someone from home. The programs that are organically developed are 
attempts to automate specific processes, but in reality what is really being automated are 
the existing tasks. A very minimal improvement has been made by these computers in the 
functioning of the squadron. 
The lack of an IT professional in the squadron is a real problem and needs 
to be addressed if squadrons want to obtain the equipment, expertise, and ability to 
become more efficient in their work processes. The way that squadrons are currently struc- 
tured, each department would have to have a dedicated information speciahst assigned to 
coordinate and standardize just their own systems. To attempt this feat across departmen- 
tal borders would likely start a mutiny. It is unlikely that a squadron could afford the per- 
sonnel resources to accomplish this anyway. However, IT resources need to be managed, 
and their use and direction need to be planned for at the strategic level. 
d. External Driver Specialization 
The final structural problem that will be addressed is that of technology 
sponsors within DOD but outside the sphere of organizational influence. In aviation, these 
sponsors include NAVAIR and NAMO. These large organizations claim to know and 
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understand what is best for the squadrons but really understand only what is best for their 
respective piece of the pie. They develop systems specific to certain departments within 
the squadron but fail to address compatibility issues between departments. NALCOMIS is 
a perfect example of this phenomenon. Many of the functions NALCOMIS provides to 
the maintenance department can also be beneficial to operations and safety. No method 
exists; however, to share the data so it is duplicated twice over, adding to the redundancy 
and inaccuracy of the process. 
B. ANALYSIS OF IDEF MODELS 
1. Purpose of the Models 
The purpose of the Onorati/Robillard model (Appendix B) and the Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Office (NAMO) organizational modeling team model (Appendix C) is to 
model the processes of a naval aviation squadron as they apply to information flow. 
Although squadrons are dynamic organizations, the information processes are so rigidly 
controlled and standardized that they undergo little change over time, even in differing 
environments. In other words, the environment will change but the processes remain the 
same. 
The models are designed to work together to give a picture of the complexity with 
which a squadron must operate. The NAMO model depicts the maintenance department of 
a squadron in great detail. Its context (highest) level represents the process of performing 
maintenance functions for the squadron and all that entails. The O/R model incorporates 
the NAMO model as its maintenance departmental view and takes the context level up one 
by representing the process of operating the squadron as a whole. Figure 8 illustrates how 
the O/R and NAMO models combine to form the whole picture of squadron operations. 
The documentation and explanation for understanding the model are incorporated 
into Appendix A. It is not our intention to explain the models and their intricacies in the 
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body of this thesis; rather, our intention is to draw conclusions from the models as they 

























Figure 8. Onorati/Robillard and NAMO Model Context. 
2. IDEF Model Analysis 
a. Overview 
The O/R model (Figure 9) breaks the squadron processes into four divi- 
sional processes (nodes A2-A5) and one manage process (node Al). This process model 
illustrates the idea of a divisionalized organizational form with departmental machine 
bureaucracies, as the processes fall within structural boundaries. With minor exceptions, 
the same controls and mechanisms are used by each of the divisional processes. Only two 
of the seven primary squadron process outputs relate directly to the squadron mission, 
with the remainder being by-products of the way business is conducted. It is evident from 
the model that many of the processes performed within the divisions are the same; again, 
showing the parochialism and poor efficiency present in the current structure. 
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Node Tree for Onorati/Robillard Project 
[AO; OPERATE FLEET SQUADRON 
■[Al Manage Squadron 
 [All] Assign Responsibility 
 [A12] Approve/Dissaprove Action 
 [A13] Administer Policy/ Dicipline 
 [A14] Evaluate Performance 




Perform Operatons Functions 
 [A31] Manage Operations 
 [A32] Perform Tactical Training 
 [A33] Schedule Operations 
 [A34] Maintain Operational Records 
 [A35] Perform Aircrew Support Functions 
Perform Admin Functions 
——— [A41] Manage Admin 
 [A42] Perform Personnel Support 
 [A43] Perform Admin Support 
 [A44] Perform Executive Support 
Perform Safety Functions 
 [A51] Conduct Safety/Natops Training 
 [A52] Maintain Safety/Natops Records 
 [A53] Uphold Safety Policy 
 [A54] Manage Safety 
Figure 9. O/R Model Process Node Tree. 
b. Squadron Information Flow 
Information flow in our task-based organization is hampered by several 
factors. First, choke points exist in the system which serve to slow down the flow. Second, 
information flow is vertical rather than horizontal which results in duplication and stan- 
dardization problems. Duplication of effort can lead to the promotion of data inconsisten- 
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cies and errors. Finally, information kept by separate sources which needs to be reconciled 
leads to an inordinate amount of wasted time and effort. 
Several choke points exist within the squadron which serve to slow the 
flow of information. At the squadron level, the process "Manage Squadron" represents the 
strategic apex and the processes they perform. They assign departmental action to the 
departments and receive feedback/products back from all the departments in the form of 
departmental reports. They act, in effect, as a filter for information entering and leaving 
the squadron. Internally generated information like flight schedules, instructions, and 
point papers are also scrutinized and subject to approval. The in and out boxes for the CO 
and XO are perhaps the busiest locations in the squadron. 
The reason for the information glut at the "manage squadron" process 
results from the need to orchestrate the processes required to cement the departmental 
tasks together. It is the nature of the process required to combine and standardize the out- 
puts of several machine bureaucracies. The same information choke points can be found in 
the four "manage department" processes for the same reasons. The difference is that the 
strategic apex of the department is concerned only with filtering the information in and out 
of their individual department rather than on a squadron level. The same phenomenon will 
be found at the division, branch, and workcenter levels. The bottom line is that the process 
responsible for the generation of an output is not the process that generates the output. 
Multiple levels of management exist that act as the output filters for the responsible pro- 
cesses. This adds complexity, inefficiency, and contributes to organizational bureaucratic 
paralysis. 
The lack of information flow between the departments is also important to 
consider. It is not our intention to promote the notion that no communication exists 
between the departments, because that is not the case. Our model shows that no formal 
method of communication exists. What information is passed across departmental bound- 
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aries depends heavily on the personalities of the individuals involved and the leadership 
philosophy. Again, this can be carried down to the division, branch, and workcenter level. 
Formal lines of communication within a squadron are vertically oriented rather than hori- 
zontal. 
The vertical communication flow results in massive duplication and stan- 
dardization problems. Each department/division/branch/workcenter may have its own 
methods and standards for producing the same information. If the information stays within 
the particular center, the only problem that results is inefficiency due to duplication of 
effort. An example w.mld be personnel data kept by the division officer and by the person- 
nel office. Since personnel maintains the service records of all enlisted personnel, all per- 
sonal data (full name address, date of rank, rate, wife's name, etc.) will be on file in 
personnel. It is also a requirement that a division officer keep personal information on all 
personnel in his/her division. This information will mirror much of the data kept in per- 
sonnel. The information on a particular member is now available in two separate loca- 
tions. When information is updated in personnel, it is not necessarily updated by the 
division officer and vice versa. Not only unecessary effort expended in duplicating the 
data but errors are likely to occur as time progresses. 
A second problem emerges when the data is required to cross divisional 
boundaries. With data being kept in separate centers, combining it can be a complex and 
frustrating process. A classic example of this is flight time statistics. At the end of each 
month, the squadron must report its flight time and other statistics to superiors. For the 
sake of redundancy, tnese statistics are maintained by both maintenance and operations. 
Maintenance draws its numbers from the data entered by the pilots into the NALCOMIS 
system. Operations draws its numbers from the data given verbally by the pilots to the 
duty officer and logged on the smooth flight schedule. At the end of the month, operations 
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and maintenance compare their numbers and, inevitably, they never match. Hours of effort 
by staff are then required to locate the discrepancies and reconcile the two sources. 
c. Process Structure 
The models illustrate the inefficiencies that exist with the squadron process 
structure. Many of the same processes are performed in numerous locations in the squad- 
ron, the most notable being the record maintenance functions. Processes exist in each 
department for the keeping of records specific to the tasks performed. Administration, Per- 
sonnel, Maintenance Admin, and Operations Admin all perform identical tasks for their 
particular department or divisions. This duplication of effort results in inefficiency and 
difficulty in integrating information systems thinking across departmental boundaries. 
As previously mentioned, each department/division/branch/workcenter has 
its own management process. All management processes are essentially the same with the 
main responsibilities of filtering information, formulating policy (standardization), and 
orchestrating processes from the level directly below. Markedly absent in the job perfor- 
mance of many managers is leadership. The mid to top line managers are so saturated with 
task generated minutia that it is difficult for them to concentrate on providing the career 
training and direction to subordinates that they are tasked with providing. The current sys- 
tem breeds competent managers capable of mastering crisis management, but who lack in 
leadership qualities. 
C. SYNOPSIS 
This chapter has provided the background on the current structure, culture, infor- 
mation infrastructure, and processes found in a typical naval aviation squadron. The task- 
based - divisionalized structure which has been successful in the past has many shortcom- 
ings which prevent the squadron from utilizing information efficiently. The culture is 
resistant to change and set in its traditional ways. The information infrastructure is out- 
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dated and fragmented The processes are duplicated and the outputs redundant. It is the 
central premise of this thesis that these factors will prevent the traditional military organi- 
zation from the ability to form a integrated information system. In order for naval squad- 
rons to remain competitive in the future, the traditional structure and task-based 
philosophy must be reengineered to revolve around the process. Only then can the organi- 




IV.  THE REENGINEERED SQUADRON 
This chapter reveals solutions to the problems we have outlined in the previous 
sections. Our framework for reengineering is presented and used to arrive at a squadron 
design we feel is more suitable to the "customer-oriented" unit necessary for future suc- 
cess and survival. Our effort focuses on the shifting of work from the current structure 
based job design to a process based design, eliminating checks and controls that do not 
contribute to the effectiveness of the organization, reducing the specialization of squadron 
personnel, and integrating information technology into the squadron infrastructure. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The five-step framework we developed and used as a guide for our reengineering 
effort is outlined below. The progression used in the layout of this chapter follows this 
guideline. 
1. Define customer and key stakeholders. 
2. Identify desired squadron outputs. 
3. Identify areas of dissatisfaction with current processes. 
4. Identify/create processes to improve areas of dissatisfaction. 
5. Identify information technology required for reengineering. 
B. CUSTOMER AND STAKEHOLDER DEFINITION 
The logical first step in our redesign is to define the squadron's customers and key 
stakeholders so that new processes can be designed to best satisfy them. This step is 
important because the purpose of the reengineering effort focuses on customer and stake- 
holder satisfaction. It is critical, therefore, to accurately define the individuals and groups 
most affected by squadron operations. 
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1. The Customer 
Since the squadron is a military organization dependant on Congressional appro- 
priations, defining the customer(s) is not as cut and dry as if a squadron were a civilian 
business with a specific target market. The determination of the customer for our organiza- 
tion must follow a different set of criteria entirely. For the purposes of this thesis, the cus- 
tomer is defined as any person or body of people who have direct input to squadron 
tasking and use the services in some manner to forward their particular cause. In essence, 
the squadron is hired by the customer to perform a service for him/her. 
Because the squadron is nested in a military hierarchy, the squadron customer will 
likely be a more senior entity in the chain of command. Depending on the situation, the 
customer could be as close as the Air Wing Commander (CAG) or as high up as the Presi- 
dent himself. Generally, while ashore, the customer will alternate between the CAG and 
the shore based type commander (e.g. COMMATVAQWINGPAC, COMFITPAC). 
While deployed, the squadrons are tasked for missions by the Battle Group Com- 
mander through his composite warfare commanders. For example, Alpha Sierra (the sur- 
face warfare composite commander) "contracts" with the aircraft carrier for aircraft 
support to perform surface search contact (SSC) missions so that the surface picture sur- 
rounding the battle group can be built. Without the constant aid of aircraft identification of 
surface contacts, Alpha Sierra's job would be much more difficult. In this case, Alpha 
Sierra is the direct customer of a squadron's services. If the aircraft perform their mission 
correctly, Alpha Sierra is happy and will continue to use the squadron asset. If incorrect 
identifications are made or aircraft are unavailable for SSC on a routine basis, Alpha Sierra 
will seek alternate methods of getting the desired service. 
The bottom line is that squadrons, like all military organizations, exist to perform 
services for people up the chain of command. It is important to establish that the faces will 
change depending on the environment but the need to satisfy these customers remains 
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constant. In the business of national defense, the customer hierarchy demands satisfaction 
because other peoples' lives depend on it. 
2. The Stakeholders 
In his book Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984), Ed Freeman 
defines a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of an organization's purpose". Freeman argues that the key to success in any 
business organization is the satisfaction of its key stakeholders. (Roberts & King, 1989) 
It was concluded that three key stakeholders exist for a naval aviation squadron; 
the American public, other U.S. Forces and units, and the squadron personnel themselves. 
All benefit in some manner from the day to day operations of a squadron and all will suffer 
if the squadron fails to perform satisfactorily. Conversely, the squadron itself is placed in 
jeopardy should it fail to satisfy any one of these groups. Each group will be discussed in 
detail below. 
a. The American Public 
In order to explain why the American public are stakeholders, the reason 
the military exists must be understood. America uses military power to defend against the 
most extreme threats to national security as determined by the elected leadership of the 
country. These fundamental security policies, as defined by the Heritage Foundation, are: 
• Protect and defend the territorial integrity of the United States of America. 
• Preserve and defend the liberty, democracy, and economic system of the United 
States from foreign threats. 
• Promote the long-term material prosperity of the American people. (Holmes, 
1994) 
These basic ideals demand the establishment and maintenance of a strong 
military to uphold them. Because the national security policy is set by elected officials, 
and the officials are elected to carry out public sentiment, by definition, national security 
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policy represents a majority view of public sentiment. Because the military, and more spe- 
cifically a naval air squadron, is a tool to enforce national security policy, it directly serves 
the interests of the public. 
A strong military has become a service most Americans would not consider 
forfeiting. In order for the public to feel secure about national security, it needs to be con- 
fident that the military is able to handle a crisis should one arise. This is the reason Ameri- 
cans pay taxes and that such a large percentage of the national budget goes to the 
Department of Defense. It is also apparent that the inner workings of the military are of 
interest to the general public. Recent issues like Tailhook, women in combat, and gays in 
the military have captured headlines across the country and raised emotional debates 
nationwide. The ease of the availability of information has also contributed to feeding 
these debates. 
The popularity of information technology has, in effect, served to lessen 
the gap between public policy and public opinion on the policy. The government is con- 
stantly under the microscope and the public able to respond instantaneously when dissatis- 
fied. The proliferation of the home personal computer and the popularity of the internet 
have allowed a new and virtually instant method of communication via electronic mail. 
Feedback from policy announced on the evening news can be forwarded directly to a per- 
son's Senator or Congressman without delay. The President even has an electronic mail 
address for public feedback. The popularity of network news magazine shows and their 
option for electronic feedback gives the public another outlet for expressing opinion on 
current affairs. Cable television networks also serve to increase public policy awareness 
with programming like Cspan and CNN. 
Many of the problems the military is experiencing in the public eye can be 
directly attributed to this boom of information technology. Incidents that would have once 
been confined to local coverage have gained nationwide exposure as various media orga- 
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nizations discover and promote them. It has become much more important than in the past 
for every member of the military to perform his/her job in a professional and efficient 
manner and for every organization to do its job as the public thinks it should, for the coun- 
try is watching closely. 
If Naval Aviation is to survive in today's climate, it must appeal to the 
American public for support. The current environment of defense cutbacks and downsiz- 
ing won't allow weak or publicly inept organizations to survive. The public has indirect 
control of the purse swings and will yell loudly when upset. As with any business organi- 
zation, the stakeholder must feel as if he/she is getting his/her money's worth or another 
alternative will be foand. In the case of Naval Aviation, the alternatives are the Air Force 
with its strategic bomber force and the Navy's cruise missiles. The mission and value of 
the aircraft carrier and its squadrons must be justified in the public eye or a branch of the 
service who has justified their mission may assume the role. 
b. Other U.S. Forces and Units 
When a squadron is called upon to perform its primary mission, it is the 
enemy who is on the receiving end of the squadrons "product". If a squadron performs its 
assigned tasks correctly, the enemy loses a portion of its combat effectiveness. If a squad- 
ron fails to complete its mission, the enemy gains the upper hand, whether it be continued 
capability of a missed target or the loss of an American aircraft. In either case the other 
forces and units involved in the conflict are directly affected by the squadron's perfor- 
mance. 
Our point is best illustrated by an example. 
• Scenario one - Success: 
As part of a coordinated air-strike against an enemy, several aircraft are 
assigned the task of rendering inoperable a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site. The site is 
part of the enemy's air defense system and must be eliminated so that air superiority can 
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be achieved. Your assigned task as part of the strike is to destroy the control van for the 
SAM missiles. Because subsequent air strikes have been planned for the area, it is impera- 
tive that the site be destroyed. 
You are successful in your mission and completely destroy the target with a 
couple of laser guided bombs. It is confirmed that the missile control van has been 
destroyed because you got the entire evolution on video tape. The subsequent missions 
can now be executed with a high assurance that the SAM threat from that particular site 
has been eliminated - a big boost in the goal of air superiority. The customer in this case, 
the warfare commander (Alpha Papa [CAG]) is satisfied that the service has been pro- 
vided, and the stakeholder (the other strike squadrons) are satisfied that the SAM site is no 
longer a threat to their strike groups. 
• Scenario two - Partial success: 
As in scenario one, you destroy the target, but your video tape recorder 
malfunctions and you do not get confirmation of the hits. In this case another airwing asset 
must be dedicated to capturing the damage on film. This involves the extra cost of launch- 
ing a dedicated photo recce mission and placing another aircraft and aircrew at risk. The 
subsequent strikes must also plan as if the SAM site is still operational until confirmation 
can be gained, adding complexity and increased effort to their strikes. In this case, CAG 
will be partially satisfied because he will not lose any of his assets to the site but not com- 
pletely satisfied. The other strike squadrons will also suffer from the added inefficiency 
dealt to the strike planning effort. 
• Scenario three - mission failure: 
In this scenario, the bombs fail to come off your aircraft and the target 
remains fully operational. On your egress, you are hit by a SAM from the site and your 
aircraft is destroyed. You eject over enemy territory and become a prisoner of war (POW). 
In this case, another dedicated strike must be launched to neutralize the SAM site. A 
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search and rescue (SAR) effort must be planned and executed to locate and pick you up (if 
possible). The training and effort it has taken to prepare you for combat must now be 
expended on another aircrew to replace you. An aircraft has been destroyed and must be 
replaced. Diplomatic and public relations efforts must be expended to counter your POW 
status and counter the negative propaganda. The stakeholders are worse off than before the 
strike and the customer is left completely dissatisfied. 
The point of this example is to show that when a squadron aircraft/aircrew 
does not perform as planned, the cost of the war effort to other units and involved parties 
increases exponentially with each scenario. In scenario one, the squadron has performed 
its task as planned and no additional expense or effort is required. Scenario two shows that 
even a minor malfunction in a key piece of equipment can lead to a great increase in risk, 
money, and effort, even though the primary goal was achieved. The third scenario shows 
how an equipment malfunction can negatively impact the effectiveness of the other air- 
wing and national assets. 
When a squadron performs its mission as planned, the enemy suffers and 
the overall war effort is simplified. When a squadron makes mistakes, the squadron suffers 
aircraft/aircrew losses, a decrease in moral and effectiveness, an increase in expense, and a 
loss of confidence in the eyes of the stakeholders. Going back to our squadron stakeholder 
definition, the other U.S. Forces and units benefit from proper squadron performance 
because their overall combat effectiveness is increased, and the squadron is placed in jeop- 
ardy if it does not perform adequately. 
c. Squadron Personnel 
The third set of key squadron stakeholders are the personnel assigned to the 
squadron. In order for a squadron to achieve acceptable states of readiness and response, 
the squadron personnel must be well trained and motivated to do their best job. Pilots must 
have the knowledge and experience necessary to correctly put their ordnance on target and 
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make it back to the earner. Maintenance personnel must be able to correctly diagnose and 
repair aircraft VTR and ordnance release systems so that problems like those described in 
the above scenarios do not occur. Administrative personnel must adequately receive, dis- 
seminate, and reply to the large quantities of information a squadron receives on a daily 
basis. More importantly, the squadron personnel must have the internal motivation and 
drive necessary to do their jobs correctly and the communication means required for the 
squadron to function ;.s a team. These qualities allow the squadron to achieve the high lev- 
els of readiness and response required to satisfy their customers. 
C. DESIRED SQUADRON OUTPUTS 
The key to the successful reengineering of squadron processes is to identify out- 
puts which will best satisfy the customers and stakeholders, then focus on the processes 
which maximize their satisfaction. Figure 10 illustrates the squadron outputs necessary to 
satisfy the key stakeholders and customers. 
1. Four Key Squadron Outputs 
Processes internal to the squadron needed to meet taxpayer, U.S. Force, and squad- 
ron personnel expectations must be focused toward achieving high levels of readiness, 
performance, and internal satisfaction respectively. In addition, the squadron must imple- 
ment processes necessary to respond adequately to customer requests. It is our contention 
that three of these outputs; readiness, internal satisfaction, and response, are actually inter- 
mediate outputs. These are the outputs the squadron reengineering effort must focus on in 
order to achieve success. The fourth output, performance, is actually derived from the 
other three outputs and is not directly controllable through process reengineering. If high 
levels of readiness, internal satisfaction, and response can be achieved through reengineer- 
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/ INTERNAL SATISFACTION 
Figure 10. Customer/Stakeholder Output Diagram. 
a. Readiness 
Readiness is a term used by military organizations to connote a certain 
level of preparedness to perform a mission. Most often, the term refers to measurable 
quantities of assets within an organization. Examples of readiness output factors for a 
squadron include manning levels, number and status of aircraft assigned, parts inventory, 
and even the dental status of assigned personnel. A unit in a high state of readiness is 
thought to be better prepared for combat than a unit in a lower state because it has the 
assets in a state determined necessary for success. One output goal of commanders is to 
maintain their unit in the highest possible state of readiness throughout the operating 
cycle. 
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Readiness figures provide comparative indications of how well a unit is 
prepared to perform its mission. The numbers are (or should be) an indication of how well 
a unit stacks up against similar units. In addition, readiness levels can serve as vessels with 
which to increase public awareness. Units that consistently maintain high readiness levels 
promote public confidence and will likely remain funded, as long as the public is made 
aware. Units who struggle with readiness will highlight themselves unfavorably and may 
jeopardize their existence. The public needs to know that they are getting what they think 
they are paying for, which is a sound national defense. Readiness figures provide a simple 
barometer for this purpose. 
b. Internal Satisfaction 
This output stems from the belief that people are an organization's most 
precious asset. In order for a unit to function effectively, the people who perform the work 
must have their basic needs satisfied. A good fit between an individual and an organization 
benefits both parties: the worker finds meaningful and satisfying work, and the organiza- 
tion gets the human talent and energy that it requires (Bolman & Deal, 1991). If a worker 
believes that the organization is supporting him/her, he/she will generally support the 
organization. The output of "internal satisfaction" is the result of the squadron's attempt at 
providing the services and support required to keep its personnel satisfied. 
Processes which currently fall in this area include service record mainte- 
nance; morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities; administrative support, dispers- 
ing services; and first lieutenant (janitorial) services. The atmosphere and support services 
provided must be focus on the squadron personnel so that they can be motivated to give 
their all to the squadron. 
c. Responsiveness 
Responsiveness refers to the ability of a squadron to react to a customer 
"order". While readiness refers to levels of a squadron's physical assets, responsiveness 
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refers to the skill with which the squadron puts them to use. Responsiveness brings to light 
somewhat more ambiguous issues such as flexibility, timeliness, communication, and 
feedback. The output will be harder to quantify but its importance to the customer can't be 
ignored. 
A highly responsive squadron will have the ability to roll with the punches 
in a timely manner. When tasked by a higher authority, it will have the means necessary to 
insure that the mission is carried out correctly at the specified time. Channels will exist to 
resolve conflicts and problems that arise, and provide the required feedback. If additional 
requirements or unexpected changes occur, the responsive squadron will adapt easily. The 
customer's satisfaction is paramount. 
d. Performance 
The concept of performance as it relates to a squadron refers to the level of 
effectiveness with which assigned tasks are performed; how well the squadron performs 
its missions. It is important, at this point, to distinguish between performance and the 
other three key outputs already discussed because fundamental differences exist. Perfor- 
mance can be considered a "derived" output because no processes exist which can be 
directly controlled by the squadron. It is a result, rather, of how effective a squadron has 
been in its readiness, internal satisfaction, and response processes. Areas such as training, 
manning, personnel motivation, scheduling, and cohesiveness all contribute to how well a 
unit performs, but in an indirect manner through the intermediate output processes. Figure 
11 illustrates this concept. 
Where the stakeholders and customers are concerned, performance is the 
ultimate output of a squadron. As the SAM site example illustrates earlier in this chapter, 
the better a unit's performance, the worse off the enemy is. The nature of war is such that 
if a unit or community fails to perform missions competently, they will be replaced by one 
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that can. Processes must be redesigned to focus on maximizing performance through the 
intermediate outputs if naval aviation is to continue to function. 









Figure 11. Squadron Output Chain. 
In wartime, a squadron's performance can be measured by effectiveness 
indicators such as ordnance delivered on target or numbers of enemy aircraft shot down. 
Peacetime indicators include inspection results, derby competition results, and sortie com- 
pletion rate. These factors indicate the level of proficiency a squadron has achieved in the 
mission areas it was assigned. Note that these indicators can't be attributed directly to 
internal processes but result from a squadron's level of readiness, satisfaction, and 
response. 
Performance represents the ultimate output of a squadron. The other three 
key outputs can be considered intermediate in the sense that they cater to only a portion of 
the customers/stakeholders. Performance, on the other hand, is critical to all customers 
and stakeholders. In addition, readiness, internal satisfaction, and response all effect per- 
formance. It is logical that a highly responsive squadron with a high readiness state and 
motivated personnel is likely to outperform an unresponsive squadron with low morale 
and low readiness. 
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D. AREAS OF DISSATISFACTION 
For change to take place, key organization members must be dissatisfied with the 
status quo and lack of confidence in themselves and their organization. This dissatisfaction 
is the source of energy or motivation for the change. That energy is essential because 
change demands extraordinary commitment. (Beer, 1988) 
This statement can certainly be applied to naval aviation squadrons. The inefficien- 
cies inherent in the way business is conducted has led to numerous problems or dissatis- 
factions throughout the organization. This section will focus on identifying these areas as 
they relate to the desired outputs of the squadron. 
1. Readiness 
In Naval Aviation, a unit's readiness is generally cyclic in nature. A unit is 
expected to be at its highest state of readiness just prior to a deployment. The unit gener- 
ally hits its lowest state just after returning from deployment and just prior to its work-up 
for the next deployment. This "readiness cycle" is common to most naval squadrons and 
results from inadequate community assets, money shortages, and the need to rotate key 
personnel out of the squadron. Assets and money are taken from returning squadrons and 
shifted to squadrons who are close to deployment because there is simply not enough for 
everyone. "Feast or famine" is the catch phrase for the cycle. 
The outcome of doing business this way is squadrons at various stages of readiness 
at any one given time. Within a two-week period, a squadron may go from the highest 
state of readiness to the lowest as its aircraft are taken and flight hours cut drastically. 
Experienced personnel are transferred out and inexperienced personnel received to take 
their places. A well trained fighting force is reduced to a unit capable of sustaining only 
hmited combat operations. This is a very inefficient way to do business. 
The inefficiency of the readiness cycle is by no means its only shortcoming. The 
current method of measuring readiness is cumbersome and deceitful. Levels of training, 
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aircraft status, aircrew, and personnel are documented internally and sent out on a periodic 
basis. If readiness numbers are grossly inflated, the state of the squadrons is perceived to 
be better that it actually is, resulting in a false sense of security. Badly needed aircraft parts 
support is slowed due to the perception that the aircraft are faring better than they really 
are. 
The final area of dissatisfaction as it relates to readiness that will be mentioned is 
that of public relations. Because the public is a key stakeholder in a squadron, it is impera- 
tive they are aware of squadron readiness states. If squadrons are to continue to receive tax 
dollars, the American public must be made aware of the successes. The object is to create 
a taxpayer uproar should it ever be suggested that naval aviation be cut. 
2. Internal Satisfaction 
The major area of dissatisfaction surrounding this output is the perception by some 
that very little internal satisfaction exists, especially among junior enlisted personnel. The 
task-based jobs they are required to perform offer little challenge or opportunity for moti- 
vation. Major challenges exist for shop supervisors and division officers to try and moti- 
vate their personnel to perform. Prevalent in daily operations is the "KITA" (Kick in the 
Rear) method of "motivation" where supervisors administer threats to induce motivation 
(Herzberg, 1987). What this accomplishes is movement and humiliation rather than moti- 
vation and tends to degrade, rather than enhance, squadron effectiveness. It is the structure 
and task base in a squadron that is most responsible for this general lack of motivation. 
Another area of dissatisfaction is that of personnel service. The perception among 
many people is that Admin and Personnel do not provide the level of service they require. 
In reality, both offices are so busy with day to day tasks that they can't possibly serve the 
squadron personnel as they should. Unfortunately, it is the personnel service that drops out 
at the expense of the paperwork, which has to get done. Both offices usually set service 
hours during the working day which may be inconvenient for many personnel, and shut 
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their doors for a period of time so they can catch up on required paperwork. This is unac- 
ceptable in a customer service department where service should be the number one prior- 
ity. A squadron member should have the opportunity to take care of a problem or get a 
question answered at any time during the day he/she has a break from work. 
This leads to the third area of dissatisfaction in the internal satisfaction area - that 
of overwork. As has been stated many times in this thesis, the workload in a squadron has 
become extremely complicated for supervisors because the processes have become so 
complex. The Admin and Personnel staff want to help out the squadron personnel but 
can't physically complete all the work they need to accomplish. The system design has 
produced this dilemma and the only solution is to reengineer the processes themselves. 
3. Response 
Dissatisfaction is this area stems from customer (higher authority) dissatisfaction 
in the output. In the military, when the battle group commander isn't happy, no one is 
happy! Customer dissatisfaction stems from poorly performed or delayed missions, which 
in turn result from poor communication, lack of timely information, and unplanned 
changes. The levels of bureaucracy which exist act to filter and dilute information and 
increase the time it takes for a mission request to reach the squadron. If the process could 
be reengineered to facilitate better communications and lessen the delay time, the cus- 
tomer will likely be more pleased with the resulting mission. 
Another problem is that of the squadron's scheduling process. The flight schedule 
takes so long to create that squadron aircrews and maintenance planners often do not 
know what they will be doing the next day until after midnight the night prior. This leaves 
little mission planning time available for other than standard missions and results in a 
"spool-ex". Operatior s officers spend a good portion of their time trying to alert aircrews 
about possible upcoming missions in order to avoid this problem, but this takes away from 
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his/her primary duties. The result can be poorly planned, off-the-cuff missions being per- 
formed. The system is very time consuming, inefficient, and reactionary. 
4. Performance 
The major problem in the area of performance lies in the fact that the three outputs 
previously discussed all effect performance. Since the outputs directly effect performance, 
the problems associated with them will also effect a squadron's ability to perform. The key 
to increasing a squadron's level of performance is to drastically improve the processes that 
lead to the intermediate outputs. A dramatic increase in performance will naturally follow. 
E. NEW PROCESS DESIGN 
Thus far, an analysis has been presented on the problems that exist in a naval avia- 
tion squadron which lead to dissatisfaction among its customers and key stakeholders. The 
next step in the reengineering effort is designing new processes which dramatically reduce 
the problems presented and lead to customer/stakeholder satisfaction. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to reengineer every specific process necessary for success. Instead, the 
focus will be placed on the process framework, infrastructure, and identification. 
1. Strategy 
It is the contention of the authors that all the dissatisfaction associated with the 
current method of operating a squadron stems from the inherent inefficiency of the system 
as a whole. Previously discussed problems of duplication of effort, poor interdepartmental 
communication, lack of standardization, poor reconciliation, and information choke points 
can all be traced directly to the lack of a centralized information infrastructure and to the 
Task-based job design, These problems lead to process complexity and, in turn, to the 
areas of dissatisfaction presented previously in this chapter (Figure 12). The strategy 
adopted in this thesis is to directly attack the core problems of the task-based structure and 











• Low motivation 
■ Inflexibility 
• Low response 
• Information duplication 
• Lack of standardization 
• Job specialization 
• Informati m choke points 
• Information hoarding 
• Poor communications 
3> 
RESULTANT PROBLEMS 
Figure 12. Root Problems Through Dissatisfaction. 
2. A New Structure 
The first order of business is to eliminate the traditional functional departments in 
a squadron and restructure around the processes that lead to the highest level of desired 
output. The goal for this process framework is to eliminate the problems associated with 
the functional departments and allow technology to play a role in the reengineering effort. 
Our framework groups processes into the three intermediate output areas defined (readi- 
ness, internal satisfaction, response) and one output support group called Information 
Central. Each of these process groups will be discussed below. 
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a. Information Central 
Information Central is the nerve-center of our redesigned squadron. As 
would be expected from the name, it serves as a central point of flow and storage for infor- 
mation on both a intersquadron and intrasquadron basis. All processes dealing with infor- 
mation record keeping, storage, reference, maintenance, reporting, and dissemination will 
be housed in Information Central. The idea is to remove the burden of these tasks from the 
output focused processes and centralize them so that information management is not the 
primary focus of their job. In addition, with a centralized information infrastructure, the 
problems associated vith multiple data storage areas and information hoarding are elimi- 
nated. 
The implementation of a centralized information infrastructure (Informa- 
tion Central) is the "enabler" for the entire reengineering effort. Areengineering undertak- 
ing of this size could not be attempted without the ability to centralize around modern 
information technology breakthroughs. The specific technology requirements for Informa- 
tion Central will be discussed in the next section but it is worth mentioning at this point 
that the required technology was not available a few short years ago. Some of the pro- 
cesses associated with Information Central are listed in Figurel3. 
b. Output Process Areas 
The grouping of readiness, internal satisfaction, and response processes 
allows a squadron to focus directly on the satisfaction of the customers and key stakehold- 
ers through a dramatic increase in efficiency. Much of the administrative burden associ- 
ated with the old way of doing business has shifted to information central, leaving more 
time for personnel to concentrate directly on the squadron outputs. The redundancy, lack 
of communication, departmental parochialism, and task specificity once present dissolves 
into a better understanding by all personnel of overall process and output goals. Figure 14 
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illustrates some of the process groupings we envision for the reengineered squadron. Note 
that the list is not all inclusive but provides a solid generalization of process areas. 
INFORMATION CENTRAL 
PROCESS EXAMPLES 
Logs & records upkeep and maintenance 
- NATOPS qualification jackets 
- Flight log books 
- Service records 
- Aircraft logbooks 
Central publication library maintenance 
- Directives and instructions 
- Standard operating proceedures 
- Maintenance publications 
- NATOPS publications 
Message tracking and dispersion 
Electronic mail services 
Telephone/computer switchboard 
External Information services 
Supply ordering/tracking 
• Information system management 
■ Report generation (internal & external) 
Figure 13. Information Central Process Examples. 
The restructuring of work around output focused processes combined with 
the efficiency of a central information infrastructure will revolutionize the way a squadron 
does business. An example may help provide insight into understanding the matter. 
a. An Example - The NATOPS Officer 
In an aviation squadron, the NATOPS Officer works under the Safety 
Officer in the Safety Department. His primary duties involve the training and evaluation of 
squadron's aircrew in the safe operation of the aircraft. The guidance for the training is 
provided by the NATOPS flight manual for the specific aircraft involved. Currently, 
NATOPS training is provided through lectures and discussions focused on aircraft proce- 
dures, flight characteristics, emergency procedures, aircraft systems, and operating condi- 
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tions. This training is usually provided at the rate of one to two briefs per week at 
squadron all-officer meetings (AOM's). 
OUTPUT PROCESS FRAMEWORK 
INTERNAL 
READINESS SATISFACTION RESPONSE 
• Manning •MWR • Scheduling 
• Public affairs • Pay support • Strategic planning 
• Currency • Health support • Fix aircraft 
• Aircraft maintenance • Service support • Tactical planning 
♦ Supply • Carreer guidance • Emergency planning 
• Training • Legal support 
• Awards/incentives 
• Intelligence 
• Transition support 
Figure 14. Squadron Output Process Framework. 
In addition to weekly training, all squadron aircrew are required to main- 
tain a NATOPS qualification annually. The requalification effort involves the successful 
completion of an open book examination, an closed book examination, and a qualification 
simulator or flight. It is the NATOPS officer's job to oversee these training and evaluation 
processes in the squadron. 
Unfortunately, the NATOPS officer is also responsible for many other areas 
not directly related the his primary duties. One of these additional duties includes being 
the NATOPS Flight Manual (NFM) custodian for the squadron. This time consuming pro- 
cess involves the following tasks: 
• Assignment and recording of NATOPS Flight Manuals and NATOPS Pocket 
Checklists (PCL's) to all squadron aircrew. 
• Collecting NFM's and PCL's from aircrew when they detach from the squadron 
• Acting as central point of contact for the drafting and CO's approval of proposed 
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changes to the NFM and PCL. 
• Generation of change notices to all aircrew when a change has been directed. 
• Tracking and recording changes as they are entered into various aircrew NFM's 
and PCL's. 
• Entering changes into all NFM's not specifically assigned to aircrew. 
These tasks are extremely time consuming and offer no true value to the 
NATOPS Officer toward his primary responsibilities, which are aircrew training and eval- 
uation. The duties as NFM custodian stem from the requirement that all NATOPS related 
publications be kept v.p to date and that every aircrew have a NFM and PCL assigned. The 
ultimate repercussion from this situation is that squadron performance suffers through 
reduced readiness because the NATOPS Officer must spend a large portion of his time on 
administrivia rather than on training and educating the squadron's aircrew. 
This problem can be easily dealt with through the aid of the centralized 
squadron information infrastructure. If the entire NATOPS publication library is put on 
CD ROM and loaded into the squadron's centralized local area network publication 
library, all members of the squadron who wish to review the NFM can simply call it up on 
their computer. The manual is available in one location where all personnel can access it. 
If a change to the manual comes out, a new CD is sent out to the squadron to replace the 
old CD and changes are implemented squadron-wide instantly. If a squadron member has 
an idea for a change to the NFM, a template can be called up, filled out, and routed elec- 
tronically through the proper channels. 
The repercussions for a simple idea such as this are far-reaching. The time 
involved in tracking, distributing, and changing NATOPS manuals is eliminated. No 
longer is it possible to have out of date publications floating around. The time and money 
invested in hard copy NATOPS manuals and changes can be used more effectively else- 
where. The logistics of carrying NFM's on detachments and deployments and their added 
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weight can be eliminated. The periodic inspections of a squadrons NATOPS libraries can 
be eliminated. Most importantly, the NATOPS Officer can use the added time to train and 
evaluate the squadron's aircrew. This directly impacts readiness, and ultimately, perfor- 
mance. 
This example is but one of hundreds in a squadron that could be reengi- 
neered through the use of a centralized information infrastructure and a focus on output 
processes. Through tie use of modern information technology, these "overhead" baggage 
processes can be centralized and dealt with in a more efficient manner, allowing personnel 
to concentrate their eüorts where they benefit the organization the most; in making the 
squadron a more effective producer of services. 
3. Process Integration 
A framework has been provided in Figure 14 for the grouping of output focused 
sub-processes, but some elaboration on how this will improve the current situation is 
needed. Because the sub-processes are "redesigned" to focus on output goals rather than 
departmental outputs, they can be considered to act on the behalf of the squadron rather 
than the departments. This leads to a far greater efficiency than in the past and allows per- 
sonnel to understand and adapt to the squadron's goals. 
For example, a way for a squadron to improve it's readiness level (output goal) is 
to concentrate on improving it's manning efficiency. Currently, manning decisions are 
fragmented within the squadron, with the responsibility spread on a departmental level. 
The Assistant Maintenance Officer deals directly with NMPC on manning issues involv- 
ing Maintenance, as does the personnel officer with Administration. The XO deals with 
NMPC on behalf of the squadron's officers. At least three separate sources of communica- 
tion with the Bureau are occurring daily within a squadron, with virtually no lateral com- 
munication occurring. 
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Under the ne w framework, manning is taken out of the departments and placed in a 
process all it's own. Personnel work, with the aid of a decision support system (DSS), to 
take care of the needs of all squadron personnel and consider manning as a squadron entity 
rather than a departmental one. Conflicts that used to occur between decision makers are 
resolved by generalists who act in the interest of the squadron. Through the use of the 
DSS, these manning personnel can benefit from the automation of certain redundant, 
cyclical tasks, allowing them to concentrate on improving the manning dilemma. 
F. REQUIRED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
It has been sa*d many times in this thesis that information technology in an enabler 
in the reengineering process. In a nutshell, this means that new ways of designing work 
are now possible due to recent technological advancements. No longer is it necessary to 
centralize information infrastructures around expensive mainframe computer systems. 
The ability to store, transfer, and secure digital information has grown by leaps and 
bounds and become less costly. Systems that were once to large and expensive have 
become portable and affordable through advances in technology. The technology required 
for a centralized squadron infrastructure, as we have developed it, will be presented in this 
section. 
1. Local Area Networks (LAN's) 
In order for a squadron to centralize its information services, a medium must exist 
through which information transfer, storage, and access can occur. Current client-server 
LAN technology allows for this medium at a reasonable cost. A LAN of this type allows 
for the squadron to be "wired" into a central database designed to accommodate the 
squadron's information needs. Specific computers called servers provide applications and 
data access that is centralized. For instance, flight time statistics are entered and stored in 
one location so that they can be accessed by all personnel and applications that need the 
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data. Duplication and reconciliation problems are eliminated and the processes which use 
the information are made more efficient. The single storage area for data also eliminates 
errors associated with updates. If an officer is promoted, the rank needs to be updated in 
only one location rather than in multiple locations throughout the squadron. 
The implementation of a squadron LAN is a large undertaking but also a necessary 
one. Many theses have been written in this area, so guidance is available. Some specific 
application development will undoubtedly be necessary but commercial off-the-shelf soft- 
ware can be utilized for many of the required portions. The squadron LAN will provide 
the skeleton on which the Information Central processes will be built. 
2. Internet Access 
Recent initiatives such as the Naval Aviation Wide Area Network (NAVWAN) are 
making it possible for squadrons and support units to connect to the Internet with very lit- 
tle effort. NAVWAN provides the information superhighway "offramp" to naval bases so 
that units can gain access. The advantages of being "connected" include worldwide elec- 
tronic mail capabilities, instant access to volumes of previously inaccessible information, 
and the ability to inform millions of people of a squadrons accomplishments. The public 
affairs aspect of the internet can't be overemphasized. The internet provides a cheap and 
effective means to increase public awareness of a squadron through home pages, elec- 
tronic bulletin boards and electronic mail capability. It can also provide a low cost and 
instantaneous method of communicating with superiors (customers) and project sponsors. 
3. Electronic Mail 
The ability to send electronic messages to anyone in the squadron is a service that 
is hard to live without. Inefficient communications methods such as phone messages, 
phone calls, message boards, and beepers can become a thing of the past with e-mail. 
Every member of the squadron will have an electronic mailbox where messages can be 
sent and stored. When logging on to the system, a message will alert a person if he/she has 
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messages. Messages can be sent to groups of people or everyone at once, eliminating the 
need for reams of paper and copy machines. If a member gets a telephone call, the duty 
officer can type out the message on the computer and send it directly to the members e- 
mail. Date and time stamps are automatically attached and the message is waiting at the 
next log on. The member can even log on remotely from a home computer to receive mes- 
sages. 
4. Expert Systems 
Expert systems attempt to emulate the decisions an expert would make in some 
particular problem domain and include ways to automate decisions in repetitive environ- 
ments (Olson & Courtney, 1992). Expert systems exist to make specialists out of general- 
ists. For instance, if a squadron pilot wants to introduce a NATOPS change request into 
the system, he goes to the NATOPS Officer and asks him/her how to do it. The NATOPS 
Officer has to take the time to explain the form and the process to the pilot and then route 
the request once it is completed. If an expert system existed to capture the knowledge of 
the NATOPS Officer, the pilot could log on to the LAN, follow the instructions provided 
for the completion of the form, and send it to the next destination electronically. Systems 
such as these to relieve individual "experts" from the responsibility of repetitive tasks dra- 
matically improve the efficiency of the system as a whole. Our system will take advantage 
of this technology to capture many of the repetitive tasks performed within a squadron and 
dramatically improve the processes associated with them. 
5. CD ROM 
The use of CD ROM technology has been mentioned previously as a method to 
centralize the NATOPS publication library. The same principles and applications can be 
applied to the countless number of publications, instructions, and regulations a squadron is 
required to maintain and follow. The monetary savings in paper alone is enough to justify 
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the switch. It is the increased ability to access the data via the LAN that makes this option 
possible. This is one step in the direction of a paperless unit. 
6. Graphical User Interfaces 
Computer systems do no good if people aren't willing to use them. Systems of the 
past have been so difficult to use that it was impractical to train everyone in their use. 
Thus, pockets of experts existed who performed their magic and seemed to get results. 
With the relatively recent introduction of graphical user interfaces (GUI's), the term user 
friendly has taken on a whole new meaning. Apple's Macintosh System and Microsoft's 
Windows are but two examples of operating systems or applications which take advantage 
of this "point and shu :.t" technology. With GUI's, the interface between person and 
machine has become a much less intimidating area and the idea of training everyone on 
computer use has become more realistic. 
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V.   CHANGE STRATEGY 
The material presented thus far in this thesis deals with making radical changes to 
a naval aviation squadron; an organization that has remained virtually unchanged for 
decades. Unfortunately, developing a new design for a squadron is only the tip of the ice- 
berg. What remains to be discussed is arguably one of the most important topics to be cov- 
ered - developing a change strategy to get from point A to point B. 
The topic of managing planned change is a highly specialized and complex field. 
The experts and consultants can't even agree on the best strategies for implementing orga- 
nizational change, as evidenced by the volumes of textbooks and periodicals written on 
the subject. One thing that the experts can agree on, however, is that any change effort 
entered blindly is likely to fail. Without a well thought out and consciously executed 
implementation strategy, any attempted organizational change effort will encounter barri- 
ers likely to prevent success. 
Half the battle in the implementation effort is an awareness of these barriers. Once 
they are understood, tactics can be planned to overcome them. Fortunately, it is possible to 
learn from the mistakes made in past failures, as well as from strategies which have 
resulted in success. This chapter presents the various "lessons learned" as they relate to the 
reengineering change process. In addition, a general guideline is presented that may aid in 
the design of a migration path for naval aviation squadrons to follow. 
A. THE CHALLENGE OF REENGINEERING 
When engaged in organizational change, it is important to realize that the organi- 
zation is a system all its own. If even a small portion of it is changed, it will have second- 
ary effects on other parts. With a major reengineering effort like the one presented in this 
thesis, major repercussions can and should be expected. People's roles within the organi- 
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zation will change, along with their beliefs and values. The specific jobs that they once 
performed will most definitely change, as will the skills required to perform the new work. 
The role of management within the organization will also change, leading to further 
changes in the organization's interpersonal relationships. This point is well illustrated by 
what Hammer & Champy (1993) call the "business system diamond". The business sys- 








Figure 15. Hammer and Champy's Business System Diamond. 
The central premiss behind the business system diamond is that an organization 
can be broken down into four distinct, interrelated areas of focus. If a change is imple- 
mented, for instance, to the business processes, it will have an effect on the jobs and struc- 
ture systems of the organization. This will illicit change in that area, which in turn, will 
effect the organizational management and measurement systems. The point is that a 
change can't be made that does not result in further change to other focus areas. As long as 
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this is understood, change strategists can anticipate, rather than react, to the effects of then- 
actions on the organization as a whole. 
In addition to these areas of focus, the change engineer must be aware of the gen- 
eral nature of human beings to resist change of any kind. Even with the most logical rea- 
sons to reengineer and a well thought out implementation plan, the change will be resisted 
by the people in the organization. The following sections present the focus area and resis- 
tance considerations every change engineer should be aware of when attempting to reengi- 
neer. 
1. Focus Area Considerations 
Reengineering will raise many questions on the effects changes will have on the 
organization as a whole. As discussed in Chapter II, reengineering poses questions about 
the hierarchical structure, reasons for existence, work processes, values and beliefs, and 
type of people employed by an organization. The following are elements, or points of 
focus, that the change engineer must consider when proposing changes to an organization. 
a. Employee Characteristics 
A successfully reengineered organization requires a different type of 
employee than was needed prior to reengineering. Because reengineering focuses on 
changing task-based work design to process based work, the people involved must shift 
from specialists to generalists. Rather than being held responsible for performing specific 
tasks which are combined to form a process, the worker will be responsible for the knowl- 
edge and completion of the entire process. A new awareness of how his/her process adds 
value to the output goals of the organization is also required. The employee will be a visi- 
ble, accountable member of the team and will be empowered with responsibility not previ- 
ously needed or desired. 
It is important to understand that not all personnel will be capable of mak- 
ing the transition. Those content with simple, repetitive tasks and who thrive under direc- 
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tion will find it very hard to adjust to the new work environment where they must make 
decisions and actually produce multiple products. Unfortunately for these workers, this is 
a fact of reengineering. 
b. Organizational Change Attitude 
An organization that accepts the challenge of process reengineering must 
be willing to continually evaluate it's areas of focus. As was eluded to when discussing the 
business system diamond, reengineering is not a one time shot. Because the organization 
is a system, it will be constantly reacting in some areas to changes made in others. It may 
take years to work out all the bugs in a reengineered organization. If the prevailing attitude 
of personnel in the organization will not tolerate this fact, the change effort will likely fail. 
c. Performance Metrics 
Two major dilemmas exist which are inherent in virtually every mission- 
driven reengineering effort (Hammer, 1994). The first is the ability to accurately identify 
and define the customers and stakeholders of the organization. The second is finding some 
measure of determining whether or not the reengineering effort is successful. An organiza- 
tion in business to make money has the "luxury" of determining how well it is doing by 
it's "bottom line". This bottom line can be expressed in a number of different ways, i.e. 
NPV, profit, price/earnings ratio, etc. If metrics are not already in place to measure a orga- 
nization's goal achievement, they must be installed to do so. The people in the organiza- 
tion must be made aware of the successes and the only way to do this is to have metrics at 
the start. 
d. Compensation 
If reengineering is to succeed, employee compensation must reflect the 
importance of the change effort to the leaders and managers of the organization. It should 
be based on how weli an employee contributes to the organization's goals and not merely 
the ability to show up for work. The focus of compensation must shift from activity to 
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results. In reengineering, value is no longer placed on the fragmented tasks that are used to 
make up the process of producing a finished product or service but has been shifted to the 
completed product or service itself. Employee compensation should reflect this fact. 
When employees are performing process work, companies should measure 
their performance and pay them on the basis of the value they create (Hammer & Champy, 
1993). The basic compensation plan for a reengineered company consists of a base salary 
plus a annual bonus for value added performance throughout the year. Unfortunately, fed- 
eral organizations, including naval aviation squadrons, have a difficult time customizing 
compensation plans because of the strict categories that people are placed in. 
e. Values and Beliefs 
In order for anything to work in a reengineered organization, the values and 
beliefs of the employees must change from a task-based "please the boss" mentality, to a 
more customer-oriented outlook. A person's job is a very important aspect of life and in 
many cases defines the person. People can and often do become identified with their job, 
so it becomes very difficult to change the values and beliefs they hold. 
In order to change their values, beliefs, and attitudes, management must 
demonstrate just how important the reengineering effort is to them and the organization. 
Organizational leaders must make reengineering the number one priority and not just 
another item on a "to do" list. The employees must see that management is serious and 
that resources, top people, and long term commitment are devoted to the reengineering 
effort. Leaders and management have the responsibility to communicate their beliefs and 
values to the employees and to demonstrate that a change is necessary. Without demon- 
strated total commitment from above, the changes in employee attitudes will never materi- 
alize. 
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2. Resistance To Change 
People are the most important resource in any organization and drastically chang- 
ing their work environment will lead to feelings of anxiety and resistance towards the 
change effort. People will feel threatened, and unless the proper preparation has been con- 
ducted prior to the implementation of the change effort, it will be resisted to the point of 
failure. The reasons for resistance can vary but resistance will be present. Some people 
will not be able to adapt because their routine has changed. Other people may resist sim- 
ply because they feel hat they have too much to lose if things are changed. They have 
spent years learning and working within the current system and feel threatened by new 
jobs and responsibilities. The greater threat to the control over his/her environment, the 
greater the resistance (Jick,1989). 
3. Overcoming Resistance 
Hammer and Champy (1993) propose five key mechanisms for aiding organiza- 
tions in helping employees overcome resistance and share in the vision of the organiza- 







Incentives are inducements to get people to jump on the reengineering 
bandwagon. They can be both positive and negative, but positive incentives are much 
more likely to promote the spirit of the reengineering effort. Incentives, however, are very 
limited in there effectiveness. For instance, the threat of terminating somebody's employ- 
ment (negative incenüve) is only valid if you can actually get rid of the individual. In the 
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military, a CO's ability to summarily get rid of people is severely limited. Incentives are 
best used and truly effective when they are used on people whose resistance is motivated 
by a perception of tangible loss. (Hammer, 1994). 
People in the military may not be good candidates for the use of incentives 
because the tangible loss factor is present in only very few cases, such as department 
heads vying for particularly sought after jobs within the squadron. The incentive of a par- 
ticularly good fitness report, or evaluation may be what is required to get a particular indi- 
vidual to perform as squired by the reengineering effort. Overall, the use of incentives is 
probably not a good a method for getting the required behavior for reengineering in a mili- 
tary environment. 
b. Information 
In many cases people will resist change out of ignorance. One way to elim- 
inate ignorance is to freely communicate with the employees the information dealing with 
the reengineering effort. Informing people means supplying people with details of what is 
happening and when it will happen. It is the best tool for managers to use to get the mes- 
sage of reengineering across. The goal of information flow is to ease the employees frus- 
tration and anxiety stemming from confusion. Even if people are opposed to the change, 
they will be better informed and therefore will be able to cope with the changes that are 
taking place. Nothing can do more damage to a change effort than rumors which run ram- 
pant. The free flow of information can alleviate this harmful situation. 
Information about the purpose and goals of the reengineering effort and 
how it will effect the organization can be effectively taught at training seminars. This is 
one method of providing the required information to the people who need it. Squadron 
newsletters and gatherings, such as quarters or AOM's, are other avenues to disseminate 
information concerning reengineering. 
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c. Intervention 
Intervention is a way of offering reassurance and support to personnel so 
that they may overcome their fears and apprehensions about the reengineering process. It 
is normally conducted individually or in small groups of people. Intervention personnel 
require skill to be able to deal with the wide range of anxieties that will be present. This 
duty may be conducted by organizational leaders but may be best left to professional 
counselors hired to aid the reengineering effort. The intervention service is one way that 
the organization can communicate directly with those individuals having the most trouble 
with the change process. 
d. Indoctrination 
Indoctrination is the process of convincing people that reengineering is 
inevitable and that it is the only way to make the organization more effective. It is about 
introducing the need for change so that people can sympathize with the effort. People must 
be aware that a change is necessary and not merely something management would like to 
do. Once people understand that reengineering is mandatory, then they will be much more 
open to the prospects that reengineering has to offer, and less likely to reject the effort. 
e. Involvement 
By helping people develop a shared diagnosis of what is wrong in an orga- 
nization and what can and must be improved, a manager mobilizes the initial commitment 
that is necessary to begin the change process (Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990). Involve- 
ment means allowing the employees to participate in the change process. This will pro- 
duce a feeling of control rather than the feeling of having something forced upon them. By 
participating in the change process, the employees will have a self-interest and develop a 
pride of ownership in the outcome of the reengineering effort. It is no longer "their reengi- 
neering effort" but "our reengineering effort". Involvement is all about teamwork, motiva- 
tion, and the achievement of organizational goals as a unit rather than as a dictatorship. 
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Resistance to change is a serious problem that must be dealt with effectively if 
organization wide change is to be successful. The five mechanisms mentioned above are 
only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to overcoming resistance. How they are used 
depends on the organization and it's circumstances. It is up to the change engineer to 
design the right balance of the five "I's" which will be most effective for that particular 
organization. They do offer a good point at which to begin to consider how the problem of 
resistance to reenginesring will be dealt with. 
4.  The Role of Leadership 
The role that ;jp management plays in the change effort can make or break the 
effort's success. In order to gain the required commitment from the employees, manage- 
ment must effectiveh sell the vision that guides the change process. If the employees 
share the projected vision for the organization, the implementation of the change process 
will proceed much smoother and with less resistance than if the employees perceive 
change has been thrust upon them. The level of enthusiasm, participation, and involve- 
ment by top leaders ir the organization will determine the success of the reengineering 
effort. It is essential to have commitment from the top or the effort will fail. 
The first step is for organizational leaders to arrive at a shared vision for the future 
of the organization. By including the employees in this process, they can mobilize the ini- 
tial support base necessary to begin the change process. Top management forcing its 
vision on the employees is not a shared vision, and is the wrong way to begin the effort. 
The employees must ouy into the shared vision for any real benefits to be realized. 
Employee involvement is crucial to establishing a common vision throughout the organi- 
zation. 
Very often, organizational leaders will have a vision of where the organization 
stands and where they want it to go. The key is that the vision must be presented to the rest 
of the organization in a plausible fashion. Hammer and Champy (1993), call this vision a 
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"case for action." The case for action offers the reasoning for the reengineering effort. In 
order for a case for action to work, it has to be clear, concise and most of all believable. 
The employees must believe that this is not just another management ploy to get more out 
of the current structure. The case for action has to be backed up by evidence, and spell out 
the consequences of trying anything less than the changes that management has proposed. 
In summary, a case for action must spell out what the organization stands to gain by 
"changing" and what it stands to lose by not doing so. It must be truthful, not exaggerated, 
and most of all it must be believable if the employees are to share the vision. 
The organizational leaders are the catalysts of the reengineering effort. By fashion- 
ing and articulating a vision of the kind of organization they want to create, the leaders 
instill everyone in the company with a purpose and sense of mission. The leaders must 
make clear to everyone that reengineering involves serious effort that will be seen through 
to its end (Hammer & Champy, 1993). 
It is up to the leader to create an environment that is conducive to reengineering. It 
is not enough for him/her to merely urge people on. The leader must be out in front of the 
organization defining the path. Leaders can demonstrate their personal dedication to the 
reengineering effort through what Hammer and Champy (1993) call the three S's; signals, 
symbols and systems. 
a. Signals 
Signals are the messages leaders send to the organization about the reengi- 
neering effort; why it is being done, how it is to be accomplished, what it is, and what it 
will take to succeed. The main tool for getting the message across is through communica- 
tion. To people unfamiliar with the concept of reengineering, it is a difficult idea to grasp. 
Simply giving a speech or two, or producing a couple of memorandums, will not get the 
message across. In order to introduce and reinforce the message of reengineering, the 
leader will have to communicate the message repeatedly. At every opportunity, organiza- 
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tional leaders will have to take the time to communicate the message to the people. Only 
through constant communication will the message of reengineering be spread throughout 
the organization. 
b. Symbols 
Symbols are the actions of the leader. The "do as I say, not as I do" mes- 
sage will not cut it in reengineering. In order to demonstrate that the leaders and manage- 
ment of the organization are serious, the leaders need to back up what they say with 
action. Training and education need to be performed in the aspects of reengineering. 
Resources, money, personnel, and time must be devoted to the change effort, along with 
the total support from management. If the organization is to succeed, a total commitment 
from organization's leadership is required. 
c. Systems 
The leader must use management systems to reinforce the reengineering 
message. As discussed earlier, management systems are those tools management can use 
to show the organization that reengineering is a serious commitment. Examples are perfor- 
mance measurement systems, compensation, and rewards. Management must be willing to 
measure and reward people's performance in ways that will encourage them to attempt 
major change (Hammer & Champy, 1993). 
The goal is to highlight people who attempt to restructure their work pro- 
cesses in innovative ways. Punishing someone who fails is definitely not sending the right 
signals about management's commitment to reengineering. Management systems should 
reward people attempting to change in a positive way, not punish them. Management has 
to reward and measure people's performance using reengineering criteria in order to get 
people to attempt change, because if you motivate people in the old way, they will behave 
in the old way. 
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B.   REENGINEERING IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES 
Thus far in this chapter, generic principles and considerations have been presented 
to make the change engineer aware of potential problems. It is now time to present a more 
specific guideline for implementing a change to a naval aviation squadron. 
The need to reengineer springs from some sort of crises, either real or perceived, 
on the part of organizational leaders. Naval aviation is currently in the midst of such a cri- 
sis. Budgets and personnel are being reduced and other branches of the service are com- 
peting for the missions that once belonged exclusively to naval aviation. Naval aviation 
must change the way it operates if it is to remain an effective and viable force in the future. 
The squadron's leadership has to be totally committed to the need for change and believe 
that reengineering is the only way to achieve it's goals. The CO and strategic apex have to 
develop a vision of where the squadron is, where it should be and how to get there. The 
reengineering change must be planned if it is to have any chance of succeeding. What fol- 
lows is a set of considerations that Commanding Officers and other leaders in the strategic 
apex of a squadron can use to help with the implementation of such an enormous change 
as reengineering. 
1. Naval Leadership Considerations 
Unlike the leadership of a civilian corporation, the leadership in a squadron does 
not have total control over the destiny of the squadron. Success in reengineering is not as 
simple as having a CO that is a visionary. Without support from the very top of the naval 
organization, there is no way that a CO can make reengineering work. A squadron is a 
small piece of a big puzzle, one that is fully integrated into an overall system. Currently, 
all squadrons operate in more or less the same manner. To alter a squadron in the manner 
that is presented in this thesis, the CO and personnel involved would be putting their 
careers on the line. A perceived failure would likely prevent any further "experiments" 
from occurring and the change effort could end before it even had a chance. 
Special concessions will have to be made for the initial squadron(s) undergoing the 
reengineering process. Perhaps an entire carrier airwing could undergo the transformation 
at once. Traditional performance measures would have to be relaxed in order to compen- 
sate for the expected struggle reengineering will present. In essence, the test squadrons 
must be taken out of the loop for a period of time and allowed to undergo the transforma- 
tion. Most importantly, the squadron must have the support of the Navy's leadership in the 
effort. The Admirals in Washington must be willing to offer the same amount of commit- 
ment as the squadron CO. If this level of support from the top can't be achieved, the effort 
will fail. Reengineering has to be the top priority of CNO on down. 
Other organization wide support considerations include: 
• Providing the dollars necessary to support the reengineering effort. Initial mone- 
tary requirements will likely surpass those of present-day squadrons. The goal is 
that it will drastically reduce spending in the long run. 
• Providing support material, commitment, and change consultants to act in the 
intervention and indoctrination process of squadron personnel. 
• Providing at least a level opportunity for the normal advancement of squadron 
personnel. 
• Consider the possibility of restructuring the Navy pay system, advancement cri- 
teria, and time requirements of key personnel to reflect the goals of the reengi- 
neered organization. 
• Providing an active public affairs effort aimed at publicizing the successes of the 
reengineered squadrons. 
• Restructuring of the training and educational facilities to focus more on the out- 
puts and processes than on individual specialization. 
• Providing the dedication and expertise in creating and maintaining a centralized 
squadron information infrastructure. 
2. Squadron Leadership Considerations 
Assuming support from the top, the squadron leadership must commit to the 
reengineering effort. The following paragraphs introduce some of the ways a squadron can 
accomplish their reengineering goals. 
a. Develop a Vision 
A squadron that is going to reengineer is one that is going to be led by a 
visionary. The CO must have a complete understanding of reengineering and what is 
required to bring about change. The strategic apex, led by the CO, will have to develop a 
vision of where the squadron could be, given the current and projected state of resources 
and, where it current!) stands in relation to the vision. 
b. Set" the Vision 
In order for reengineering to occur, the entire squadron must share the 
vision of the organization's leadership, i.e. strategic apex and CO. This is likely to be the 
biggest challenge facing the leadership given the tradition of the squadron as an organiza- 
tion. If they can't sell the vision, then the reengineering effort is likely to fail. Selling 
reengineering can be helped in part by creating a reengineering atmosphere using the three 
S's and the methods discussed for overcoming resistance. As mentioned earlier, not all of 
the methods mentioned will work in every circumstance. The CO will have to have a good 
feel for the people in his/her organization in order to apply the methods that will work 
best. 
c. Appoint Process Owners and Reengineering Teams 
Involving the sailors and officers in the reengineering process is essential 
to the successful squa-iron reengineering effort. Identifying processes that need immediate 
attention and are gooc candidates for success is a must. Squadron members can then be 
assigned to reengineering teams to design a better method of completing the process. By 
involving squadron members early in the process and on successful projects, they can 
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demonstrate the affects of reengineering to the rest of the squadron, and simultaneously 
build confidence in the change effort. A good starting point for reengineering teams would 
be to focus on processes that are geared toward satisfying squadron personnel; in other 
words, processes geared toward the internal satisfaction output. If squadron personnel are 
beneficiaries of a reengineered process, then the benefits of reengineering may become 
apparent. 
d. Focus on the Customer 
Properly identifying the customers is a very difficult thing to do. Chapter 
IV presents a discussion on possible solution to this dilemma. Conducting internal surveys 
and holding focus groups can help squadron personnel reach a similar conclusion. It is 
very important that the customer is identified and the team stays focused on what it is that 
the customer requires. Once this is accomplished, the squadron managers must continually 
focus reengineering teams on designing processes which contribute to the satisfaction of 
the customers. 
e. Benchmark and Set Stretch Goals 
A snapshot of the squadron should be taken prior to the reengineering 
effort. The squadron outputs and effort required to produce them must be highlighted for 
future comparison. From that point, a baseline can be established and goals can be set that 
will challenge the organization into trying to met the newly set goals. These goals should 
prompt the teams into trying innovative methods of designing the process so that the goals 
can be met. Emphasis should be placed on increasing internal efficiency, using the squad- 
ron information system to its full advantage, and producing higher levels of output. 
/. Move Fast 
Reengineering is not adaptable to a piecemeal type of change. It is about 
radical change that attempts to completely modify people's values, beliefs, and attitudes 
about their work environment. This needs to be done as quickly as possible in order to 
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combat resistance and complacency about Change. The longer it takes to achieve results, 
the less interest people outside the organization will have. In addition, the energy levels 
required to effect reengineering can't be sustained indefinitely. 
g. Accgpt Risk & Imperfection 
Not everything attempted in the reengineering effort is going to work the 
very first time. Management must be willing to accept failure as part of the change to 
reengineered work environment. Failure means that people are trying to innovate and try- 
ing different ways of performing work. Management should not punish people for trying 
something new that does not work out. Encouragement and patience must be exercised or 
the signals sent by leadership will not be compatible with the symbols sent. Lessons 
should be learned form every attempted reengineering effort so that they can be applied to 
other reengineering efforts. 
h. Don't Stop Too Soon 
A reengineering effort requires a long term commitment from everybody 
involved, especially the CO and senior leadership in the squadron. Continuity in CO's is 
extremely important for the long term success of the organization. If the employees see 
leadership's faith and determination beginning to waiver, theirs will also. Leadership has 
to commit for the long haul and not quit when the going gets rough. Because squadron 
personnel also rotate in and out of the squadron, usually on a three year cycle, continuous 
training and education must be provided in order to keep the continuity of the reengineer- 
ing mind set in the squadron. 
C. SUMMARY 
A process of change is undertaken in response to many different stimuli. An orga- 
nization may want to change in response to competition, or because the leadership of the 
organization feels that it is no longer productive and needs to change the way that it does 
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business. In the case of a naval aviation squadron, it is the pressures of having to perform 
the same missions with fewer resources, personnel and money, combined with a change in 
environmental factors that is driving the perceived need for change. 
The change effort will have far reaching consequences and cause changes to other 
elements throughout she organization. The characteristics that employees once displayed 
will no longer fit into the new way of working. The employees will have to change their 
work habits or perhaps jeopardize the entire change process. Performance measurements 
and compensation methods will also have to be reexamined, due to the new work pro- 
cesses. Most importantly, the values and beliefs of the employees will have to change to 
reflect the values and beliefs of the new organization. 
The change process won't be easy. It is a long arduous process that requires an 
inordinate amount of planning and patience. The employees will not want to change 
because they are comfortable with the old way of doing business. Management will have 
to do a skillful job of imparting their vision on the employees. If resistance is not expected 
and a plan for overcoming it is not made, then the change effort is likely to fail. However 
there are a number of ways to overcome resistance. Leaders and managers can use combi- 
nations of the five I's: incentives, information, intervention, indoctrination and involve- 
ment, to overcome resistance. This is by no means the only method of dealing with 
resistance, but it is a good place to begin to look for answers. 
A reengineering effort needs someone from high in the organization to champion 
the reengineering cause. It can not happen from below. The CO of a squadron has to lead 
the reengineering effort because it is he or she who has the vantage point necessary to see 
how the squadron's processes relate to proposed output goals. It is the CO as leader who 
has the position to be able to develop a vision for the squadron and then share that vision 
with the rest of the organization. But, that person has to be out in front of the organization 
leading the way, not merely supporting it while working on other more important things. 
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Reengineering has to be the most important thing the organization is doing if it is 
to be successful. How the leaders act, their values and beliefs, and how they support the 
reengineering effort will be severely scrutinized by the employees and if any lack of faith 
is detected, then the employees will begin to question not only their commitment, but also 
the commitment of the squadron's leadership to the reengineering effort. 
There are a number of guidelines that are very helpful when trying to implement a 
change such as reengineering. Among them are developing a vision about the organization 
and sharing it with the rest of the organization. Involving the employees in the change pro- 
cess and focusing on ,!ie customer are two very important elements of reengineering. 
Without the customer, the organization has no reason for being in business. Management 
has to be willing to accept imperfection and even failure. People should not be punished 
because they are trying to innovate. Finally, the reengineering effort should not be aban- 
doned too early in the effort. Reengineering is an iterative process that will take a very 
long time to implement. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The motivation for this thesis lies in the hope that a design can be formulated for a 
naval aviation squadron that will improve both the efficiency and output focus of present- 
day squadrons. The keys to this end involve the incorporation of modern information tech- 
nology systems and a change strategy capable of producing the desired results. The fol- 
lowing questions were proposed as a guideline to achieve success in this project: 
• How does information flow within a typical squadron? 
• How can the information flows be modeled? 
• What factors are responsible for the problems identified in this thesis? 
• How can the current system be improved? 
• What barriers would be encountered in attempting the required organizational 
change? 
Chapter I introduced the information required to understand why a change is 
needed. Environmental circumstances have forced organizations within the Department of 
Defense to do more with less. Drastic defense spending cuts coupled with the proliferation 
of defense related information have contributed to the highlighting of military ineffi- 
ciency. In order to remain competitive, DOD organizations must take advantage of 
available technology in information systems to reduce the areas of inefficiency. Unfortu- 
nately, the automation of current work processes is not enough to dramatically improve 
current methods. In order to reap the maximum benefits available through the use of infor- 
mation technology, the work processes themselves need to be scrutinized and redesigned. 
One change strategy which has merit in the goal of achieving work redesign is pro- 
cess reengineering. Chapter II presents an overview of reengineering as it deals with the 
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squadron, and presents the reasons why reengineering is a good option for a change strat- 
egy. The reengineering effort focuses on rethinking the way processes are performed in an 
organization. With the aid of technology, these processes can be analyzed and redesigned 
around output goals to greatly improve efficiency and customer/stakeholder satisfaction. 
Reengineering offers alternatives to the drawbacks commonly found in task-based organi- 
zations, such as a naval air squadron. 
Although not unique as a change strategy, reengineering does offer many advan- 
tages over other methods. Because it focuses on the work processes themselves, it is easier 
to adopt information technology into the work design. In addition, reengineering puts the 
output process focus where it belongs, on the customer. The implementation of informa- 
tion technology in the process will allow information systems to pick up the role of per- 
forming the routine, cyclical tasks which were so time consuming in the past. This fact 
allows personnel to devote more time to performing their primary duties and contributing 
more to the squadron's goals. 
In Chapter IIIV an analysis of the current naval air squadron is conducted in an 
attempt to answer the first three research questions presented. It includes a generic look 
and analysis of the hierarchical structure, task specialization, culture, and use of informa- 
tion technology common to today's squadrons. Problems with the current organization are 
also presented; specifically, the problems associated with information flow within a squad- 
ron. To illustrate these problems, a high level view of squadron information flow using the 
IDEF-0 modeling tool was developed. The Naval Aviation Maintenance Office IDEF-0 
model was also incorporated as an analysis tool. These models are presented in Appendix 
B and C. Though not the only modeling tool available, IDEF-0 provides a solid base for 
modeling static processes within an organization. 
In Chapter IV, the common principles of reengineering are discussed and used to 
devise an answer to the question of how the problems outlined in Chapter III can be 
96 
improved (research question # four). The chapter begins by defining the squadron's cus- 
tomers and key stakeholders. Specific output measures are then linked to each for the pur- 
pose of focusing processes on them. Specific areas of dissatisfaction related to the four 
output measures are then introduced so they can be analyzed and improved. An example 
of a reengineered process structure is proposed which groups the processes into output- 
based categories. Examples are also presented to illustrate the benefits of restructuring in 
this manner. Lastly, examples of the information technology required for the reengineer- 
ing effort are discussed. 
Chapter V presents considerations for answering the final research question. In it, 
the process of organizational change is discussed and some of the lessons learned from the 
past are provided foi consideration. These "barriers" to change can be planned for in 
implementing change within a squadron and overcome if armed with the right set of tools. 
If naval aviation is to remain a viable competitor for military missions in the 
future, something must be done to increase it's competitive advantage. Navy air must do 
more with less and focus it's assets on the satisfaction of the customers and key stakehold- 
ers. The path to this goal is twofold. First, a reengineering, or similar type of effort, must 
be conducted to improve the efficiency and focus of internal squadron processes. Second, 
a centralized squadron information infrastructure must be formed to enable the change 
effort. These steps will allow Navy squadrons to rid themselves of work methodology 
appropriate for a paper-based world, and replace them with work modes that leverage the 
attributes of information technology. 
As with most change efforts, reengineering takes time. The information technol- 
ogy to enable the change effort is now available and affordable. Effort must be taken soon 
to begin this process of squadron change or it may be too late. It is too hard to ignore the 
ramifications of failure to do so. This strategy promises a squadron that is better prepared 
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to perform it's missions, more efficient, less costly, and more motivated than units of 
today. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The problems associated with Navy squadrons which are presented in this thesis 
represent a conglomeration of viewpoints collected over a number of years by the authors. 
They are derived from a perceived consensus and personal experience. No attempt was 
made to conduct a scientific survey of the naval aviation community to validate these 
viewpoints. It is hoped that the arguments for process reengineering are taken as they were 
intended - to serve as a methodology for solving problems within the naval aviation com- 
munity. 
Unfortunately, this thesis has only scratched the surface in the amount of research 
necessary for the reengineering process. Though possible, the amount of coordinated 
effort and man-hours required to actually reengineer a squadron's processes far exceed the 
time allotted for this project. In addition to the reengineering effort, the resultant central- 
ized information infrastructure would likely have to be developed and coded profession- 
ally. Though limited in scope, this thesis provides one method of integrating a squadron's 
information systems. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Because this thesis covers the reengineering effort on a high level, many opportu- 
nities for continued research exist in this area. Armed with the background and guidance 
presented in this thesis, the following areas need to be examined in order to continue the 
reengineering effort: 
• The lower level IDEF-0 models of each department must be completed so that a 
more thorough understanding of existing squadron processes can be gleaned. 
The specific processes necessary for the achievement of intermediate squadron 
output goals (Readiness, Internal Satisfaction, and Response) must be identified 
and reengineered. 
■ The standards and architecture necessary for the implementation of the squad- 
ron's centralized information infrastructure need to be identified. 
• The integration issues expected when introducing a reengineered squadron into 
the current military hierarchy need to be examined. 
> Once the central information infrastructure has been identified and the required 
processes redesigned, the migration path for implementation must be identified. 
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APPENDIX A: UNDERSTANDING IDEF-0 
This appendix outlines the basic IDEF-0 background and concepts necessary to 
understand the models presented in Appendixes B and C. This information is a condensed 
version of the information presented in the IDEF/Design 2.5 Tutorial manual. 
MODELS 
A model is a symbolic representation of a system, where the model can be used to 
derive information about the system that it represents. The system in this case is a set of 
interacting components and the relationships among them. Models can be based upon a 
couple of different modeling paradigms and the choice depends upon the type of system 
being studied and the purpose of the model. A static model paradigm is one that is used to 
represent the structure of a system, but not it's behavior over time. A dynamic model para- 
digm, commonly called a simulation, is one that is used to represent both the structure of a 
system, and it's behavior over time. What type is chosen depends on what is required of 
the model and what is being studied. A static model is less powerful than a dynamic 
model, but will provide all of the information that is required if all that is being studied is 
the structure of the system, and that can be achieved for a fraction of the cost and overhead 
associated with a dynamic model. 
Since there is no clear cut dividing line between a system and it's surrounding 
environment, a model has to restrict what is included to only parts that are of interest The 
model of the squadron is no different. The only factors included in the model are those that 
are of interest in the modeling of the squadrons processes, what each process does, and 
how the information flows from one process to the next. 
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IDEF-0 defined. 
IDEF stands for ICAM Definition, and ICAM stands for Integrated Computer 
Aided Manufacturing, and is one of many types of modeling systems. IDEF-0 happens to 
be a static modeling paradigm intended for modeling systems that consist of discrete 
activities that transform inputs into outputs. It is particularly well suited for modeling the 
data processing and information flow and also the actual daily operations in a naval avia- 
tion squadron. The IDEF model is composed of activities that use mechanisms and con- 
trols to turn inputs into outputs. The inputs, controls, outputs and mechanisms are referred 
to a ICOM's. 
An activity is a component of a system that performs a specific action. The action 
is always the transformation of one or more inputs into one or more outputs, using the 
mechanisms and controls. The IDEF model is then a hierarchy of the activities in the sys- 
tem. The top most activity is a single activity that represents the system as a whole, depict- 
ing all of the inputs from the outside environment, into the system and what is eventually 
produced by the system, or the outputs to the environment that contains the system. All of 
the controls and mechanisms used to convert the inputs into outputs are shown acting on 
the upper most activity. 
The top most activity can be decomposed into lower level activities, that represent 
the processes of the system that is being modeled. These lower level activities represent 
the processes themselves and graphically show how each activity relates to other activities 
in the system. Each lower level activity may then be decomposed even further, until the 
desired level of refinement is obtained. The ICOM's that are associated with the top level 
of the structure can also be decomposed, allowing their components to be dealt with at 
lower levels in the model. The ICOM's not only link each of the levels together, they also 
link the activities to each other at each level. 
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IDEF components: 
Activity - An activity is a system component that transforms an input from the out- 
side environment into an output, that is either passed on to another activity, or is a finished 
product that is passed on to the environment outside the system. An activity uses mecha- 
nisms and controls to accomplish the transformation. Activities are represented as boxes in 
the model diagram, and are labeled with the name of the activity. 
ICOM - ICOM stands for inputs, controls, outputs and mechanisms. Inputs are 
something that are consumed by an activity in the process of transforming inputs into out- 
puts. Controls are things that direct or regulate how an activity is to perform the transfor- 
mation. An output is the result of or produced by the activity, based on the inputs, controls 
and mechanisms. Finally, a mechanism is something that facilitates the actual accomplish- 
ment of the transformation. A mechanism could be a person, facility, machine or other 
agency that performs the activity. 
In general, an ICOM can be anything that is used by an activity to produce outputs. 
They can be physical objects, rules and regulations, information, people, or any other 
object that is relevant to the purpose of the model. In the model, ICOM's are represented 
by arrows that are entering the activity boxes, and are classified as either an input, control, 
output, or mechanism by the side of the box in which they enter. 
Purpose of the Models 
The purpose of the models, the Onorati/Robillard and Naval Aviation Maintenance 
Office (NAMO) organizational modeling team, are to model the squadron as it is currently 
organized. The modeling paradigm employed for the models is from a static viewpoint, 
because how the organization operates over time is not important for the purposes of the 
study. The squadron is a dynamic organization, however, the processes are so rigidly con- 
trolled and regulated, that no matter what environment the squadron is operating in, the 
manner in which the processes are carried out will remain pretty much the same. In other 
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words, the processes don't change, but the environment in which the organization is oper- 
ating will. 
Onorati/Robillard model 
The purpose of the model is to illustrate the information flows required for the 
decision making process, and the complexity of the design of the organization required to 
produce the information. The Onorati/Robillard model is based on a combined 16 years of 
squadron level experience. It is a static model of how the overall squadron is organized 
and the hierarchy of the processes involved with decision making. The model also illus- 
trates extremely well how the degree to which the squadron structure fragment the pro- 
cesses. Each department in the squadron performs many of the same core processes, and 
those processes are broken down into many individual tasks. These tasks have to be man- 
aged, and coordinated in order to produce any worthwhile information. 
Core processes are what really make the squadron operate and able to fulfill is mis- 
sion. Processes such as manning, which ensures that the squadron is manned with the right 
amount of people, and those people are in the right ratings, training, administrative func- 
tions, and personnel support functions are some of the processes that are common to all of 
the departments and therefore could be considered "core processes". The model shows 
that these processes are not only fragmented into each of the departments, but upon further 
inspection, are even further fragmented down to various divisions within each department. 
The context diagram, or the top page in the model hierarchy, depicts what is to be 
modeled. It shows the squadron as a whole, with all of the inputs to the squadron from the 
outside environment, and all of the outputs of the squadron back to the outside environ- 
ment. It also shows the things that control the transformation process and what mecha- 
nisms are used to help in the transformation process. The structure of the squadron is also 
readily apparent from the model. 
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APPENDIX B: THE ONORATI/ROBILLARD MODEL 
This appendix contains the Onorati/Robillard model - a high level IDEF-0 model 
of a squadron's information processes. 
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APPENDIX C: THE NAMO MAINTENANCE MODEL 
This appendix contains the Naval Aviation Maintenance Office model - an IDEF-0 
model of a squadron's Maintenance Department processes. 
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